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Abstract 
 
On 14-16 June 2017, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
organized a landmark event at the JRC site in Ispra, Italy site to support exchange on 
emerging risks in chemical accident and Natech risk reduction between European Union 
(EU) and EU affiliated countries, that is, EFTA and EEA countries, EU Enlargement 
countries and EU Neighbour Policy Initiative (ENPI) Countries.   This combined seminar 
and training event was the first time that all EU and EU-affiliated competent authorities 
met together to share perspectives on implementation of the Seveso Directive, and 
equivalent national efforts in non-Seveso countries, to identify areas of common 
concern and to seek opportunities for mutual support.  The main purpose of the event 
was to exchange on common challenges in chemical accident risk reduction and to give 
training to competent authorities on newly available JRC tools for assessing 
consequences and risks associated with chemical and Natech accidents.   It also aimed 
to welcome EU affiliated countries, many of whom are on the path towards Seveso 
implementation, into the network of Seveso competent authorities to participate in 
these exchanges.  A critical outcome was the identification of emerging risks and 
ongoing priorities that could be the focus of future collaborations in the Seveso 
community to improve risk management and enforcement. This report highlights these 
emerging risks and summarizes main points and conclusions derived from the 
presentations and discussions in the seminar and training sessions. 
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Executive Summary 
The 2017 Chemical Accident Risks Seminar and Training event marks the first time 
that EU and EU-affiliated competent authorities met together to share perspectives on 
implementation of the Seveso Directive, and equivalent national efforts in non-Seveso 
countries, to identify areas of common concern and to seek opportunities for mutual 
support.  The event was jointly funded by the DG-ECHO-JRC project, Seveso Capacity 
Building in EU Neighbourhood Countries, under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 
and the JRC Enlargement and Integration activity.  The main purpose of the event 
was to exchange on common challenges in chemical accident risk reduction and to 
give training to competent authorities on newly available JRC tools for assessing 
consequences and risks associated with chemical and Natech accidents.  It also aimed 
to welcome EU affiliated countries, many of whom are on the path towards Seveso 
implementation, into the network of Seveso competent authorities to participate in 
these exchanges.  A critical outcome was the identification of emerging risks and 
ongoing priorities that could be the focus of future collaborations in the Seveso 
community to improve risk management and enforcement. This Executive Summary 
highlights these emerging risks and summarizes main points and conclusions derived 
from the presentations and discussions in the seminar and training sessions. 
In a continuation of its long tradition of promoting networking among Member States 
on implementation of the Seveso Directive, and in light of recent technological 
advances and the EU’s long term goals to strengthen its partnerships within the 
region, the JRC proposed to organize and host a seminar to support exchange 
between EU and EU-affiliated countries on topics of importance to chemical accident 
risks governance.  In particular, a majority of Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
countries, motivated by rising industrial development and assisted by EU policy 
priorities, are actively building towards implementing the Seveso Directive or 
equivalent programme.    With common borders and shared industrial hazards, and in 
many cases, historical relationships and cultural similarities, the EU and its 
neighbours to the east and south have a natural interest in helping each other work 
more closely together on reducing chemical accident and Natech risks.   
The so-called Chemical Accident Risks Seminar (CARS) was envisioned as a 
mechanism to extend the EU Seveso network to promote exchange on chemical 
accident risks and risk management between EU/EEA Seveso Countries and the EU 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries.  In particular, the event was intended to:  
 Identify the need for further work by the Seveso community on new emerging 
risks/new developments in the area of industrial accident prevention.   
 Expand the existing EU/EEA exchange network to include all EU-affiliated 
countries 
 Rejuvenate exchange between EU/EE countries that had diminished in recent 
years due to budget cuts at both EU and national level.   
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 Provide an opportunity for training on the JRC’s flagship risk analysis products 
for Seveso competent authorities, the ADAM1 (chemical accidents) and RAPID-
N2 (Natech accidents) consequence and risk assessment tools. 
Event programme 
The event consisted of a 1 ½ day seminar event divided into 6 sessions, and two 
additional half days on either side of the seminar were allocated for training on the 
JRC ADAM and RAPID-N consequence and risk assessment tools.   
The topics of the seminar were as follows: 
  Safety performance measurement:  How should we measure and track 
performance in chemical accident risk reduction?  
  Integrity of installations and equipment:  How can we make more 
progress in reducing risks from infrastructure weaknesses, including ageing 
sites, high intensity processes, and small and medium size sites? 
 Safety and IT security:  What does accelerating use of IT technology on 
hazard sites mean to site risk managers and to the enforcement community? 
 Organizational change:  How do economic trends and changes in industry 
and government influencing chemical accident risk reduction and can negative 
impacts be mitigated?  
 Substance classification:  What are the current challenges for identifying 
high hazard sites that should be covered by the Seveso Directive (or 
equivalent national programmes) and what problems do countries face as they 
are working towards establishing a hazardous site inventory?  
General outcomes and highlights of the event 
Outcomes and feedback from participants give evidence that the event met the four 
objectives with considerable success.  The seminar met participation goals by 
attracting 71 participants from 30 different EU and EU-affiliated countries, and having 
different perspectives from all European regions, including industry experts, reflected 
in the seminar agenda.  Fifty-two (52) participants received training on the ADAM 
(chemical accident) and RAPID-N (Natech) consequence and risk assessment tools 
during the event. 
In total, 71 experts from 30 countries, including 3 Enlargement countries, 7 
Neighbourhood Countries, 1 EEA Country and 19 Member States, participated 
in the event, with more than 50% coming from the 30 EU/EEA countries, and nearly 
25% from the 10 Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries. Almost all countries 
volunteered a presentation.  In addition, the agenda also included speakers from 3 
industry organizations and 2 speakers from the research and consulting fields.   The 
                                          
1 https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/ADAM/content  
2 http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
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seminar also benefited from presentations from JRC experts on cybersecurity and 
disaster risk management.  In total, there were 44 different presentations delivered in 
the seminar. 
Outcomes of individual sessions 
1) ADAM and RAPID-N Training  
The introductory training events proved a powerful mechanism for obtaining 
interest and even excitement about the tools from many countries In feedback 
from the training, both from personal exchanges and evaluations, many participants 
expressed satisfaction from the introductory sessions that the tools could meet their 
consequence and risk assessment needs.  
The interest and feedback regarding the tools generated a variety of commitments as 
well as potential future work programme elements for ADAM and RAPID-N tools.  
Based on the country’s request, the JRC plans bilateral trainings in various countries.  
Needs of competent authority users will also trigger development of additional 
features and modules, such as an emergency planning module for ADAM and 
additional natural hazard modules for RAPID-N.  
2) Performance Measurement 
There is still a long way to go in obtaining leading indicators of performance 
trends in hazardous industries.  The CEFIC/ICCA metrics are a positive step 
forward towards indicators.  The chemical industry has conducted extensive research 
and elaborated concrete guidance in order to help their memberships.  The current 
chemical industry initiative to make certain measures public is important, particularly 
for transparency and stimulating dialogue in the public domain.   
However, many other hazardous industries have yet to take a similar commitment.  
Moreover, a majority of sites still struggle with how to select and use safety 
performance indicators as true performance measures.  Similarly, competent 
authorities struggle with how to evaluate these efforts on their Seveso sites. 
Without leading indicators, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify 
government resources aimed at chemical accident prevention and 
preparedness as the years go by and no major accidents occur.  While the 
reporting of major accidents in eMARS is invaluable for recording and exchanging 
lessons learned, it is not adequate for performance measurement. Moreover, EU 
governments, with some exceptions, have not been aggressively seeking to adopt 
proactive safety metrics to identify trends and emerging risks for themselves.  More 
varied forms of measurement are needed to reflect the government’s impact.  
Implementation of site-based measurement by competent authorities as 
leading indicators for emerging risks could be further explored.  More varied 
forms of measurement are needed to reflect the government’s impact.  
Implementation of site-based measurement by competent authorities as leading 
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indicators for emerging risks could be further explored.  Some countries (e.g., 
Norway, the United Kingdom) are already leading the way in this regard.   
For pre-Seveso countries, national hazardous site inventories and incident 
reporting systems are essential building blocks of national safety 
performance monitoring. Preliminary evaluations of known hazardous sites 
(through questionnaires and/or site visits) can also be a positive step towards 
establishing a baseline for measuring progress.   
The results of these discussions indicate that some potential areas of future 
collaboration exchange could be: 
1) Experimentation and collaboration between governments on various types 
of indicators could be particularly useful, notably measures that provide input as to 
whether government programmes to reduce chemical accidents are working generally 
across the economy, such as loss data.   
2) Exploration and testing of measurements that evaluate the impacts of 
inspection and other enforcement and compliance measures. Some specific 
feedback that would be useful regarding the effectiveness of Seveso inspections and 
the influence of different  enforcement approaches across the EU. 
3) Pre-Seveso countries to establish a baseline to evaluate progress as more 
rigorous measures are implemented.  Full implementation and resourcing of the main 
obligations of the Seveso Directive could be relevant indicators, for example 
In conclusion, there appears to be a need for focused government exchange and 
collaboration on collection of data to support macro and micro-safety performance 
measurement of chemical accident risk governance.  This topic could be taken up in 
the various forums where governments meet and discuss how to address challenges 
in monitoring and oversight of hazardous industries.  
3) Mechanical integrity 
Mechanical integrity is still a main cause of concern on hazardous sites in 
Europe and neighbouring countries.  For example, the UK programme measuring 
performance of ageing plants revealed that > 70% of sites are managing their asset 
risks adequately.  Italy appeared to have considerable findings from inspections 
related to mechanical integrity as well.   Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) 
seem to have particular difficulties (e.g., due to lack of specific competence, lack of 
resources, and heavy reliance on external technical organizations.) 
Risk assessments and risk-based decisions are often constructed on false 
assumptions about mechanical integrity, as evidenced by recurring accidents 
involving mechanical failures on sites with supposedly robust risk management 
programmes.  Age, changes in ownership, profitability loss of corporate history can 
sometimes obscure mechanical weaknesses.  Sometimes sites will be accustomed to 
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working with insufficient knowledge or inadequate conditions leading to complacency 
about the risks. 
Failure to recognise mechanical vulnerabilities has an enormous impact on 
the safety of the entire process.  Mechanical failures can initiate or accelerate the 
accident sequence.  Potential vulnerabilities in critical systems can include 
containment equipment (e.g., pipes and vessels), control measures and 
instrumentation (safety valves, alarms, etc.), and common services (e.g., 
generators). 
Effective management of site integrity is a good story for business and for 
the public.  Insufficient mechanical integrity leaves sites very vulnerable to losing 
their right to operate in the face of a serious incident or concerned citizens and 
politicians.  Conversely, a proactive mechanical integrity programme can often be a 
selling point in risk communication.  Moreover, the costs of critical equipment failure, 
especially potential collateral damage, create a clear business case for a mechanical 
integrity programme as a key component of a loss prevention strategy. 
In conclusion, many accident scenarios feature mechanical integrity as the 
critical factor, or “weak link” in process safety.  For this reason, it is difficult to 
justify making broad assumptions about system integrity of safety-critical processes 
when parts of the system have not been evaluated or degraded conditions of some 
parts are ignored.  Risk assessments should be based on realistic and informed 
evaluations of system integrity.   
The impacts of systematic approaches to assessing site mechanical integrity 
should be evaluated over time.  The technique works on the assumptions that 
measurement motivates better performance. Tangible results could motivate more 
competent authorities and operators to adopt this approach. 
Mechanical integrity is also assumed to be a leading indicator for safety 
performance.  Systematic assessment of site mechanical integrity could become also 
be used as a performance trend measurement for government and industry alike.       
4) IT security and safety challenges 
Awareness and identification of risks associated with advanced industrial 
control systems is lagging behind its implementation.  There will need to be 
close and ongoing collaboration directed at incorporating process risk management in 
industrial controlling systems.  IT specialists generally speak a different language 
than process engineers and industrial control designers.  Overcoming professional and 
cultural barriers are likely to remain a significant challenge in this regard for years to 
come.  
In the EU, knowledge and tools to support inspections and oversight of cyber 
safety and security at EU Seveso sites are not widely available.  The seminar 
represented one of the first occasions where industry and government have 
exchanged good practice and experience in this regard.  It is still somewhat early to 
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understand the full implications of cyber security and automation with process safety 
for Seveso inspections.  The possibility was mentioned that some competent 
authorities may require support from an IT expert resource to support Seveso 
enforcement and oversight at sites with advanced industrial controls systems. 
Security clearance could also be a requirement for inspectors at some sites.   
The number of remotely operated sites should be expected to increase in 
future.  Lack of a strategy and criteria in the face of a rapid increase would result an 
ad hoc approach to risk management creating potentially serious risk management 
gaps on individual sites.  Without any precedents or standard models to follow, 
competent authorities may be very vulnerable to legal challenges should they choose 
to confront operators on risk management issues.  
In conclusion, there needs to be more discussion among competent 
authorities and industry on cyber safety and security risks and practical 
exchange of good practice and experience.  Whether competent authorities need to 
address cyber security interfaces with process safety remains an open question. 
Exchange between authorities overseeing safety and those overseeing security 
matters could also be explored as a way of monitoring these interfaces.   
Competent authorities needs some basic rules and criteria as a starting point 
for addressing cyber safety and security in inspections and when reviewing sites and 
installations for permits or commissioning. A simple set of principles will be 
particularly helpful to small countries and pre-Seveso countries.  Eventually, more 
comprehensive guidance may emerge in national authorities as they gain knowledge 
and experience. 
EU authorities will likely have to develop consistent approaches to 
overseeing industrial control systems and remotely operated sites.   Issues 
such as minimum safety requirements and inspection strategies and tools may benefit 
from agreement on common approaches at EU level.  Collaboration on monitoring and 
enforcement may require standardization and international collaboration.  Criteria 
may need to be developed for acceptance of remotely operated sites.  Bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between countries may need to be established as already 
exists for other cross-national hazards such as pipelines. 
5) Organizational change 
The OECD upcoming guidance on ownership change of hazardous sites 
provides an important new practical tool for operators and government. It 
also represents the first time that the expert community has examined mergers and 
acquisitions in the chemical industries as a site risk management issue and provided 
concrete evidence and guidance in this regard.  Notably, the EU chemical industry has 
expressly recommended the use of this tool by companies involved in site acquisition 
and divestiture. Every effort should be made to disseminate the guidance as broadly 
as possible in the coming years. 
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Industrial parks are a particular organizational structure that has long been 
considered as an important mechanism for catalyzing economic growth in 
emerging economies.  The concentration of activities lowers infrastructure costs 
and transaction costs may also be lowered when business partners are located on the 
same site.  Nonetheless, these conglomerations pose particular challenges for risk 
management in terms of assigning accountability and ensuring appropriate oversight 
of common services that can affect safety.  Depending on the proportion of hazardous 
facilities on site, some industrial parks may be vulnerable to domino effects once an 
accident sequence is triggered. 
Work outsourced to contractors continues to be a risk factor on many 
hazardous sites, in particular, since outsourcing of many functions plays a 
fundamental role in the business models of many hazardous industries.  In 2012 a 
JRC study revealed that subcontractors were a factor in nearly 6% of incidents in the 
eMARS database. The study also showed that EU major accidents involving 
contractors had increased dramatically in recent years, rising from a yearly average of 
1.1 between 1991-2000 to 3.4 per year from 2000-2010.3 The accident at the BASF 
site in Ludwigshafen, Germany of October 2016 gives evidence that contractor 
management requires constant attention.   
Organizational change is not just an issue for industry.  The ability of 
government to oversee and enforce effective risk management on hazardous sites can 
also be compromised by organizational changes and reduced staff resources in 
government institutions.   
Capacity building to achieve high standard of risk governance requires 
significant changes in government and industry.  Meaningful progress usually 
requires gaining access or investing in new competencies, launching or augmenting of 
support services, often accompanied by structural re-organization.  There is a 
question as to how much  stakeholders in pre-Seveso countries, as well as their 
external partners, take account of these factors in planning capacity building 
activities, developing legislation, and establishing timelines for implementation. 
In conclusion, the OECD Guidance on Ownership Change at Hazardous Sites 
should be disseminated widely and its implementation should be closely followed.  
It may be important to assess the impacts of the guidance and whether there are new 
lessons learned from implementation. 
Further exchange on risk management of industrial parks and joint ventures may be 
particularly valuable for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries.  Tools such as 
ADAM and RAPID-N can also support consequence and risk assessment for 
aggregated risks from hazardous sites in industrial parks. 
Changes in government organizations, or in government requirements, also merit 
preparatory analysis of impacts prior to implementation.  Re-organization of 
                                          
3 From the Lessons Learned Bulletin on major accidents involving contractors, listed under “References” in 
this section. 
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government services, loss of staff competence, and modifications to legal 
requirements, are changes whose impact on both government and industry 
performance may need to be assessed and addressed as appropriate. Capacity 
building for pending alignment with the Seveso Directive in Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood country are changes that have greater chance of success if planned 
and calibrated over time in consideration of individual country strengths and 
limitations. 
Part of change management is also managing expectations.  Gathering 
information on the current situation can aid management and staff to develop a 
common in understanding of what could change.  From here, they can map a 
common strategy to avoid that certain changes do not become accident triggers. 
There are a wide range of other types of organizational changes that can influence 
site risk, such as the impacts of staff reductions, joint ventures, and major structural 
reorganization on risk management of hazardous sites. The seminar did not include 
presentations on all the relevant topics simply because they were not proposed.  
Indeed, the topic has become quite large and it is likely that much more exchange on 
organizational change is necessary to give attention to all the issues and identify 
innovations in monitoring and management that help to mitigate their disadvantages. 
6) Substance classification 
Effective governance of chemical accident risks requires knowing the degree 
and type of hazard, and where the hazard is located.  Hence, implementation of 
every government programme starts with the establishment of a national inventory of 
major hazard sites.  Countries establishing new programmes have the challenge of 
getting adequate information to identify their hazardous sites as far in advance of 
implementation, so that it can be planned with adequate resources and interventions 
are targeted appropriately with realistic timelines.  Countries with mature 
programmes have the challenge of making sure their site inventory matches reality. 
Substance classification matters.  For good reason, authorities and operators are 
particularly sensitive to the costs, not just in Euros but in lives, of making wrong 
judgements about which sites are hazardous and why.  Keeping up with new 
substances and new information affecting classification of known substances is 
essential to maintaining an up-to-date risk management strategy that uses available 
resources in the best way possible. 
Classification of dangerous substances has always been problematic for 
some substances for a variety of reasons, e.g., insufficient data, conflicting data 
interpretations, influence of processing conditions, non-normative behavior, etc.  The 
EU CLP Regulation and the GHS are not immune but are relatively new, such that the 
processes for making improvements are still in development. 
The application of generic criteria, an approach taken by the UN GHS Classification 
System, EU CLP Directive and adapted further by the Seveso III Directive, is a 
standard and well-accepted approach to regulation of dangerous substances.  It is 
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also true that these instruments, perhaps deliberately to an extent, do not fully 
address the challenge of making generic rules fit the infinite possibilities associated 
with certain categories of substances, notably mixtures (and particularly waste), and 
substances such as organic peroxides and ammonia nitrate, all of whose dangerous 
properties vary substantially with different formulations.  
Identification of likely sites for Seveso coverage is often undertaken in pre-
Seveso countries, such as many Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries, in 
order to assess potential resource and competence issues that will arise once new 
comprehensive legislation is authorized.  In the absence of a notification requirement 
for all hazardous sites, countries will use alternative methodologies and information 
gathered from existing enforcement and monitoring activities associated with 
chemicals management, environment and civil protection and labour safety.     
In conclusion, the EU CLP Regulation has introduced some significant 
improvements, in particular, self-classification by manufacturers, that 
encourage transparency and are self-maintaining.  The new openness afforded 
by the EU CLP regulation may eventually reduce uncertainties associated with 
classification of certain substances, but at the moment, there are not enough 
mechanisms for dialogue that can make the system not only open but dynamic.  
There is room for initiative among industry and government stakeholders to help 
close this gap.  
For some types of substances, it is likely that ongoing dialogue is always 
necessary.  Finding the right classification for specific substances may to some 
degree always be an iterative process.  Some cases may also benefit from 
clarifications in future revisions to Seveso legislation, but this is likely to be far in the 
future.  
Countries working towards higher levels of governance of chemical accident 
risks, such as alignment with the Seveso Directive, correctly prioritize 
establishment of a national inventory of hazardous sites even prior to adopting 
the enabling legislation.  Capacity building should include fostering exchange and 
collaboration to support countries in developing strategies to identify and qualify 
hazardous sites. Standardized training tools on applying the Seveso substance criteria 
within the context of the EU CLP Regulation could also be useful. 
Summary of observations and conclusions 
Competent authorities need comprehensive consequence analysis tools that 
are cheaper, easier-to use, more versatile and transparent than what is 
available currently in the marketplace.  Competent authorities can face a vast range 
of situations from site to site, with variation in type substance, size of site, level of 
competency, risk assessment methods used, and geographic location. There are no 
comparable applications in the marketplace for Natech risk analysis nor that allow the 
wide range of flexibility and customization of analysis design as ADAM. These 
applications are tailor-made for authorities but are also used by industry and 
practitioners. 
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There is overwhelming evidence from competent authorities that the ADAM and 
RAPID-N applications fill an enormous gap in the arsenal of tools available for 
countries to help protect citizens from negative aspects of industrial development.  
The eagerness with which competent authorities embrace these tools was not only 
confirmed by this training event but also past training events, as well as by feedback 
from stakeholder tests during development, and by actual users. RAPID-N has already 
been applied for earthquake-triggered Natech risk assessment since some years.  
While safety performance indicators (SPIs) have been in use in many 
companies (mostly large multinationals) for more than two decades, 
industry is only now developing a common understanding on their design 
and functionality. Nonetheless, confusion and skepticism surrounding their use have 
not entirely disappeared.  Skepticism often is generated in large part from the 
confusion.  While no one disputes the concept of SPIs as an ideal, interpretation of 
what they actually should be and how they should be applied appears to vary widely.   
Guidance is emerging in industry and more consensus and models of good practice 
are likely to evolve from these efforts.  The major industry associations are making 
reporting certain measures a condition of membership.  (Although these reportable 
indicators represent a narrow range of measures, they serve a slightly different 
purpose than site-specific measures since the public is the targeted audience rather 
than any specific site.)  While much more development needs to take place, these 
outcomes represent significant progress, requiring many years of dedicated effort to 
achieve. 
Government authorities in many cases either ignore safety performance indicators or 
struggle with how to use them in a compliance context, although a few countries have 
embraced them. Even when both sides are enthusiastic about the concept, there may 
still be disagreement on what should be measured and interpretation of results. The 
discussions at the seminar indicated that in both industry and government, there is a 
lot of work to do to understand whether and how safety performance indicators can 
be a relevant and even vital component of chemical accident risk management. 
Context is important. In some companies, SPIs provided considerable value as a 
communication tool within the organization and the metrics selected have no 
operational value except to communicate.  However, if they are intended to be an 
integral part of site safety performance monitoring, they must give meaningful and 
timely feedback on safety performance. In the latter role, the SPI must be designed 
to give feedback on aspects of operations that affect safety. 
Mechanical integrity may be an old issue, but it remains possibly the most 
fundamental principle of chemical process risk management. It is never more 
relevant than today, even considering that the industrial age is now arguably two 
centuries old.  At this stage, every country in the world is exposed to industrial risk 
from its operations to some extent and some to a very large extent.   
Considerable industrial expansion took place throughout the world in the latter half of 
the 20th century.  There are a lot of sites more than 20 and even 40 years old that are 
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still operating.  Mechanical integrity requires unyielding attention on older sites.   
Notably, many of these sites are oil and gas operations, such as refineries, where a 
high volume of dangerous substances is common and the infrastructure is vast. 
New technologies need to take lessons from the old ones, even virtual technologies.  
Right now they seem unbreakable, but in 20 years they will suffer from degradation 
and obsolescence, just like the older industries.  It remains important for industry and 
government to use all means available, data collection, risk-based approaches, 
development new tools, etc. in order to reduce risks from infrastructure and 
equipment failures.  
If mechanical integrity is the old-timer in this group, cyber safety and 
security is the newcomer.  The seminar featured an interesting mix of 
presentations from industry, researchers, and government authorities. Awareness of 
potential impacts of automation and network-linked functions has been growing and 
some organizations have already been working to understand the main issues and 
define new standards to address them. 
From the work underway, it appears that significant improvements to assure 
reliability and integrity of equipment and infrastructure are already implemented or 
well progressed.  Moreover, there is a question as to whether cyber security threats in 
any way are nearly as high a concern as threats to plant physical integrity.  On the 
other hand, while increased connectivity and automation can greatly reduce some 
process risks, they also can sometimes raise new questions for process risk 
management and regulatory enforcement.  Incidents have already arisen with 
connectivity as a common cause and continuously unmanned sites operated from long 
distances, even other countries, represent a new permutation of an old model (the 
unmanned site) that has never made regulators very comfortable. 
Moreover, the vast majority of regulators, and possibly many operators, are just at 
the beginning of the information gathering stage on how IT technology can change a 
process risk profile, what standards are in place to assist risk management, and 
where the gaps in understanding and guidance remain.   
Safety management systems remains an important and dynamic mechanism 
for addressing the management rather than the technical factors affecting 
chemical accident risk.  In the past decade or so, there has been widespread 
emphasis on the role of organizational factors on the functionality of the safety 
management system.  That is, the structures and processes within an organization 
are now considered to have a tremendous influence on the effectiveness of safety 
management on major hazard sites.   
It has taken an accumulation of serious accidents and disasters to focus attention in 
this direction.  It also seems that as awareness about organizational factors has 
grown, causal evidence can be found everywhere, even in analysis of accidents 
occurring decades before.  The proliferation of multinational companies across the 
globe, the industrialization of countries in all parts of the world, the transformative 
role of automation in industrial processes, and many other developments have the 
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potential to have both positive and negative impacts on how organizations see their 
risks.  Moreover, technology will continue to revolutionize the workplace and the ups 
and downs of the economy will continue to produce dramatic shifts of ownership and 
employment as well as new management strategies in hazardous industries. 
Both government and industry have endorsed the notion that management of 
organizational change is part of chemical accident risk management.  Some steps 
forward such as the OECD guidance on corporate leadership and on ownership change 
have already been taken.  There is a lot more work to do. 
Proper identification of dangerous substances on site is vitally important to 
making the right decision about prioritizing and managing chemical accident 
hazards.  Among all the information needed to make good risk management 
decisions, every risk assessment starts with hazard identification.  Every hazard 
identification starts with the identification of dangerous substances on site.  To 
manage risks effectively, sites have to know each dangerous substances on site, how 
dangerous it is, how much there is of it, and what it can do if planned controls of the 
danger fail.   
Nonetheless, obtaining clear and definitive data to classify every substance and 
mixture of substances with certainty is a never-ending process.  The rules developed 
over time and enshrined in such instruments as the UN GHS, the EU CLP Regulation 
and the Seveso Directive, provide more clarity than ever before. In particular, they 
allow more debate and transparency over how classification decisions are reached.  
But these instruments are never as clever as nature, so the way forward is to 
continue to work together to fill the gaps through creating and using mechanisms to 
promote dialogue and consensus.  The instruments themselves may also in time be 
improved as experience brings more understanding.   
Considerable work in future lies ahead in finding ways to share and make decisions 
together on the basis of new information and in adapting the instruments to 
incorporate new knowledge that can be generically applied to a set of problems that 
affects many substances.  
Final observations 
Just like the technologies that produce them, chemical accident risks are complex, 
making heavy demands on engineering, natural sciences, the psychological fields of 
human and organizational behavior, and the science of business management, to 
name a few of the disciplines that need to be regularly consulted.  With so many 
factors, and so many analytical specialties needed to understand them, managing and 
overseeing chemical accident risks cannot be successful in isolation.  Operators and 
authorities have an awesome responsibility shared by counterparts around the world, 
and they need to be able to get help from each other.  Hopefully, in various ways, 
these types of events can continue to be held as long as our social well-being and 
economic survival depend on goods generated through industrial production and 
technologies.   
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1. Background and Description 
On 14-16 June 2017, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
organized a landmark event at the JRC site in Ispra, Italy site to support exchange on 
emerging risks in chemical accident and Natech4 risk reduction between European 
Union (EU) and EU affiliated countries, that is, EFTA and EEA countries 5 , EU 
Enlargement countries6 and EU Neighbour Policy Initiative (ENPI) Countries7.   This 
combined seminar and training event was the first time that all EU and EU-affiliated 
competent authorities met together to share perspectives on implementation of the 
Seveso Directive, and equivalent national efforts in non-Seveso countries, to identify 
areas of common concern and to seek opportunities for mutual support.  Motivated by 
rising industrial development and assisted by EU policy priorities, a majority of 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries are actively building towards implementing 
the Seveso Directive or equivalent programme.    With common borders and shared 
industrial hazards, and in many cases, historical relationships and cultural similarities, 
the EU and its neighbours to the east and south have a natural interest in helping 
each other work more closely together on reducing chemical accident and Natech 
risks.  The event was jointly funded by the DG-ECHO-JRC project, Seveso Capacity 
Building in EU Neighbourhood Countries8, under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism9, 
and the JRC Enlargement and Integration activity10.   
This report explains how and why the seminar was organized and summarizes 
outcomes of the event, including a reflection from the seminar Steering Committee on 
the potential implications of key arguments emerging from the seminar for risk 
management in future. 
In the present day, the Seveso Directive is widely considered the most effective 
model for building a comprehensive national chemical accident prevention and 
preparedness (CAPP) programme.  It is a performance-based measure that places 
                                          
4 Natech = Natural hazard events causing chemical accidents 
5 http://www.efta.int/about-efta Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland 
6  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information_en Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey 
7  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries_en 
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Ukraine.  As a practical matter, the JRC 
Seveso work in ENPI countries does not include Libya or Syria because of the ongoing 
conflicts in those countries. 
8  https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/content/minerva/a93c18e3-b2ba-46c4-b467-
3fe02773ec7e/seveso_capacity_building_in_eu_neighbourhood_countries  
9  
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/civil_protection_en.p
df  
10 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/working-with-us/enlargement-and-integration  
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direct responsibility on operators for keeping their plants safe but imposes also 
rigorous requirements on government authorities to track and motivate operator 
progress.  Implementation of the Seveso Directive poses significant challenges for all 
national authorities because it is a comprehensive risk management and enforcement 
programme covering all aspects of chemical accident disaster risk reduction.    
Since the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, it has 
been acknowledged that the developed world has a shared responsibility to actively 
support developing countries in acquiring knowledge, tools, and regulatory 
frameworks that will lead to the sound management of chemicals in these countries.   
The EU also has considerable strategic motives for aiding its neighbours in this 
regard, including shared borders, shared natural resources, strong trading 
relationships, and shared responsibility for the sustainability of technology supporting 
trade. In addition, the inability to control chemical accident risks can create 
instability, should a major accident occur, and undermine security, particularly the 
control chemical weapons risks.  For this reason, EU policies for disaster risk reduction 
and for peace and stability both include support for capacity building in chemical 
accident prevention and preparedness as a priority. 
Within this policy framework, the JRC’s Major Accident Hazards Bureau (JRC-MAHB) 
has led scientific and technical support to Seveso Directive implementation in the EU, 
in association with DG ENV since the first Seveso Directive was authorized in 1982.   
For almost 20 years, the JRC-MAHB has contributed to capacity building of countries 
currently in the accession process, as well as providing ongoing support to new 
countries as they move up the learning curve towards mature Seveso programme 
implementation. It offers unique capacity building opportunities for governments 
seeking to improve their chemical accident prevention programmes, associated with 
its long term collaboration with EU countries in promoting good practice and lessons 
learned, and developing tools to assist them in chemical accident risk analysis.  
1.1. The purpose of the event 
Since the first Seveso Directive was authorized in 1982, European Union Member 
States recognized that working together allows every country access to a bigger pool 
of expertise and expertise for a very challenging area of risk governance.  These 
challenges stem from the diversity of industry and substances with chemical accident 
risks and the need for scientific competence and experience in both government and 
industry to oversee and manage them effectively.  These conditions impose 
particularly high demands on small and medium size governments where even a few 
hazards close to populated areas can require substantial attention to maintain an 
acceptable risk profile.   As indicated in the Text Box on the next page, information 
exchange has been a core contributor to EU government efforts to improve chemical 
accident risk reduction. 
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EU Expert Exchange on Chemical Accident 
Risk Reduction:  A Long and Fruitful 
Tradition 
For over three decades, the JRC-MAHB, 
supported by DG ENV, has facilitated a 
programme of ongoing exchange of good 
practice and experience between Seveso (EU/ 
EEA) countries.  The exchange programme has 
multiple benefits for reduction of chemical 
accident risk in Europe: 
 Accelerates the transfer of new strategies and tools 
for more effective oversight of high risk sites 
 Conveys new lessons learned from recent incidents 
and  helps  the  community  to  keep  “old”  lessons 
alive 
 Allows small and medium‐sized countries to acquire 
new learnings and techniques from the investments 
of  large  industrialized  countries  in  research  on 
strategies and tools for chemical risk oversight 
 Supports free trade in the European Economic Area 
by  promoting  common  practices  for  sustainable 
production across the region 
 Contributes  to  the  professional  development  of 
competent  authority  staff providing new  learnings 
for managing risk in this complex field. 
While the exchange itself is valuable, the events 
can also results in production of tools and 
technical briefs for implementation, such as  
 Handbook  of  Chemical  Accident  Scenarios  for 
Emergency and Land‐Use Planning  
 Common Inspection Criteria  
 Seveso Inspection Good Practice Reports  
 A  study  of  Seveso  Implementation  in  Lower  Tier 
Establishments  
These and more publications from EU level 
exchanges on chemical accident risk are 
available at   
minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/shorturl/minerva/p
ublications. 
The Chemical Accident Risks Seminar 
(CARS) was conceived as a mechanism to 
extend this model to promote exchange on 
chemical accident risks and risk 
management between EU/EEA Seveso 
Countries and the EU Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood countries.  In particular, it 
was intended:  
 To expand the existing EU/EEA 
exchange network to include all EU-
affiliated countries 
 To rejuvenate exchange between 
EU/EE countries that had diminished in 
recent years due to budget cuts at 
both EU and national level.   
 To provide an opportunity for training 
on the JRC’s flagship risk analysis 
products for Seveso competent 
authorities, the ADAM 11  (chemical 
accidents) and RAPID-N 12  (Natech 
accidents) consequence and risk 
assessment tools.  
It was considered that a seminar that met 
these three objectives would make the 
event attractive to countries with a 
diversity of interests and needs. The need 
for an EU event that could support EU 
competent authorities and bring EU 
affiliates into the Seveso network became 
particularly clear in 2015-16 when the JRC 
conducted a number of multilateral and 
bilateral workshops in which challenges in 
Seveso implementation with EU 
Neighbourhood countries were discussed.  
In parallel, the JRC has also been engaged 
in supporting capacity building for Seveso 
implementation in Enlargement Countries 
and since 2014 the JRC extended its 
Seveso capacity building work to EU 
                                          
11 https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/ADAM/content  
12 http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
2017 Chemical Accident Risks Seminar and Training Workshop  18 
 
Neighbourhood countries in the JRC/ECHO Seveso ENPI project13 .   The JRC has 
hosted a multilateral Seveso event for Neighbourhood (ENPI) and Enlargement 
countries in 2013, 2015 and 2016, administered a Seveso implementation survey to 
ENPI countries, and held several bilateral workshops.    
A striking impression from each encounter was that each country had difficulties with 
the same frustrating issues that EU competent authorities have discussed over many 
years of exchange, such as, unknown risks of hazardous sites near urban areas (e.g., 
ammonia manufacturers, large storage sites), lack of co-ordination among competent 
authorities, building safety culture and competence in industries, convincing local 
populations that risk was manageable, how to gain confidence in the operator’s risk 
assessment, etc.  Moreover, many EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries lack 
vibrant networks internally or externally where they can discuss their challenges with 
chemical accident risks with like-minded colleagues. 
It follows that there is also an overwhelming interest from EU and EU-affiliated 
countries in JRC consequence and risk assessment tools for chemical and Natech 
accidents.   From any event of the last 3 or so years, where the tools have been 
presented, there are numerous comments on evaluation forms emphasizing that “we 
need these tools”, “when will they be available?”, “when is the next training?”  The 
tools are freely available to competent authorities (or will be in the near future)14 and 
developed specifically with the needs of Seveso competent authorities in mind.   
These observations eventually led to the conclusion that the JRC’s 2017 Seveso event 
should be for the entire network of the EU and all its regional partners.   The EU 
countries would benefit from the training and an additional forum for exchange on 
Seveso implementation, while also would gain knowledge important to chemical risk 
management in countries where they share borders, trade and often historical ties.  
For the Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries, training and exchange with EU 
countries would offer fast track learning on their path towards implementing 
comprehensive chemical accident risk legislation.   
1.2. Organization and structure  
The seminar was organized with the intent of maximizing participation of all countries.   
To this end, the JRC took a number of decisions for structuring the event and 
encouraging active engagement of participants with the advice of a Steering 
Committee of competent authority experts.  
                                          
13  JRC-MAHB/ECHO collaboration on building capacity for chemical accident prevention and 
preparedness in Neighbourhood countries that started in 2014. 
14 The earthquake module of the RAPID-N tool  for calculating consequence and risks for Natech 
events is already available at http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.  A flood module is in 
development and expected to be launched for testing in 2018.  The ADAM tool for consequence 
and risk assessment of chemical accidents will be launched online in 2018. 
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The seminar topics would address a variety of topics on emerging issues 
associated with Seveso implementation and chemical accident risk management.  This 
approach had the advantage that each country was likely to be interested in at least 
one topic.  Feedback from the seminar could stimulate input on topics that would be 
attractive for a subsequent seminar. 
 
A seminar plus training would make a convincing argument for a country’s 
participation in the event.  It was assumed that all countries would be interested in 
training on consequence and risk assessment tools.  Therefore, two training sessions 
each were scheduled on RAPID-N and ADAM, allowing more possibilities for all 
participants to have training on each tool. 
The seminar would give more time to presentations than to discussion15.  
This strategy allowed participants to put a face to almost every country at the event 
(because they almost all had a presentation) and a talking point for bilateral 
exchange at coffee breaks and meals.  The organizers accepted the risk that this 
strategy would limit the time available for discussion on key topics during the 
seminar, with the view that the more participants would benefit from the opportunity 
for bilateral exchanges.   
 
                                          
15 It was also decided that the seminar would not provide interpretation from other languages 
into English (and vice-versa), with the exception of speakers.  The language of EU technical 
networks is English and providing interpretation would undermine the networking objectives, 
especially if many countries sent non-English speakers.  Recognizing that speakers experience 
particular challenges, speakers were offered the opportunity to have interpretation, but no one 
requested it.    
 
2017 CARS Steering Committee Members 
Isabelle Borgonjon, Federal Public Service Employment, Labour &Social 
Dialogue, Belgium 
Mark Hailwood, LUBW, Germany 
Miljenka Klicek, Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, Croatia 
Ragnhild Larsen, Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, 
Norway 
Francisc Senzaconi, General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, 
Romania 
Julie Sharman, Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom 
Michael Struckl, Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, 
Austria 
Svetlana Stirbu, Danube Logistics, Moldova 
Fabrizio Vazzana, National Institute for Environmental Protection and 
Research, Italy 
Simone Wiers, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The Netherlands 
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It was determined that the event would consist of a 1 ½ day seminar event divided 
into 6 sessions, and two additional half days on either side of the seminar were 
allocated for training.   
The JRC sent out a notice to all country focal points of the seminar event in November 
2016, inviting suggestions for seminar topics.  Subsequently, the JRC formed an 
advisory team of 10 national experts who had experience in multilateral venues for 
chemical accident prevention and preparedness.  Over a series of conference calls, 
the advisory team, called the Chemical Accident Risks Seminar, or CARS, Steering 
Committee, brainstormed on seminar topics, including suggestions offered by the 
various countries, and agreed on 5 topics (one would be covered in a double session).   
The topics were as follows: 
 Safety  performance measurement:  How should we measure and track 
performance in chemical accident risk reduction?  
  Integrity of installations and equipment:  How can we make more progress 
in reducing risks from infrastructure weaknesses, including ageing sites, high 
intensity processes, and small and medium size sites? 
 Safety and IT security (double session):  What does accelerating use of IT 
technology on hazard sites mean to site risk managers and to the enforcement 
community?  
 Organizational change:  How do economic trends and changes in industry and 
government influencing chemical accident risk reduction and can negative impacts 
be mitigated?  
 Substance classification:  What are the current challenges for identifying  high  
hazard   sites  that  should  be  covered   by   the   Seveso  Directive  (or 
equivalent) and what problems do countries face as they are working towards establishing a 
hazardous site inventory?  
The Steering Committee agreed that these topics represented the most common 
issues of concern in competent authorities in the European Union and its Affiliated 
Countries. Although the participating countries may have different regulatory 
regimes16, they face many similar challenges.  Trends in chemical accident risk tend 
to be dominated on the one hand by economic and technological developments 
associated with multinationals, and on the other hand, by small and medium-size 
enterprises that bring a different set of challenges.  Despite differences industry size  
                                          
16 All enlargement countries have started preparations for transposition and implementation of 
the Seveso.  Neighbouring countries are more varied in that some plan to transpose (or have 
already transposed) the Seveso Directive into national law, while others are more inclined to 
target alignment with the Seveso Directive rather than outright transposition.  
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Table 1 Chemical Accident Risks Seminar and Training – Countries/Organizations 
Represented 
Representation  EU Relationship  No.
  
Role (in addition to participation) 
Albania  Enlargement  2  1 Speaker 
Armenia  Neighbourhood  2  1 Speaker 
Austria  Member State  1  1 Chairperson, Steering Committee 
Belgium  Member State  3  1 Chairperson, Steering Committee 
Bulgaria  Member State  3  1 Speaker 
CEFIC  Industry  2  1 Speaker 
Chemical  Business 
Association 
Industry  1  Speaker in 2 sessions 
Croatia  Member State  4  1 Session Chair, 1 Speaker, Steering Committee 
Czech Republic  Member State  1  1 Speaker 
Denmark  Member State  4  1 Speaker 
DG‐Environment  European Commission  1  1 Chairperson 
Ergonomica  Research/Consultant  1  1 Speaker 
Estonia  Member State  1  1 Speaker 
Finland  Member State  2  2 Speakers 
Georgia  Neighbourhood  3  1 Speaker 
Germany  Member State  4  1 Chairperson, 2 Speakers, Steering Committee 
Hungary  Member State  1  1 Speaker 
INERIS  Research/Consultant  2  1 Speaker 
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Israel  Neighbourhood   3  Speaker in 3 sessions 
Italy  Member State  3  2 Speakers 
Kosovo  Enlargement  2  1 Speaker 
Latvia  Member State  1  1 Speaker 
Lebanon  Neighbourhood  1    
Malta  Member State  1  1 Speaker 
Moldova  Neighbourhood  2  1 Speaker, Steering Committee 
Montenegro  Enlargement  1   
Netherlands  Member State  2  1 Chairperson, Steering Committee 
Nopco Paper   Industry  1   
Norway  EEA/EFTA   3  3 Speakers, Steering Committee 
Palestine  Neighbourhood  2  1 Speaker 
Poland  Member State  2  1 Speaker 
Romania  Member State  1  1 Chairperson, Steering Committee 
Slovakia  Member State  2  1 Speaker 
Slovenia  Member State  1  1 Speaker 
Solvay Group  Industry  1  1 Speaker 
Sweden  Member State  2  1 Speaker 
Ukraine  Neighbourhood  1    
United Kingdom  Member State  2  2 Speakers 
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Several respondents (10) obtained ideas regarding topics for additional training for 
their operators and authorities.  Substance classification was cited in particular as a 
potential topic for future networking.   A number of respondents also appreciated the 
industry perspective on topics such as cyber safety and security and safety 
performance measures.  A selection of participant comments on the seminar are 
shown in Figure 4 above. 
In addition to the topics noted in Figure 3 (page 24), respondents also mentioned 
gaining important information and new ideas regarding: 
 Guidance available (4) 
 Land-use planning (3) 
 Ammonium nitrate risks (3) 
 Risks associated with remote installation (2)  
 The opportunity to identify potential partners (2) 
 The importance of risk communication and public awareness (2) 
 Different approaches to implementation of the Seveso Directive in various countries (2) 
  
“Including authorities of other EU countries in [our] activities and research-
organizations in other EU countries in [our]research projects would be interesting.” 
“Including authorities of 
other EU countries in 
[our] activities and 
research-organizations 
in other EU countries in 
[our] research projects 
would be interesting.” 
“The seminar provided 
an opportunity to take a 
broader look at risk 
assessment in other 
countries.” 
“The “Seveso-Rules” are 
also interesting for other 
[countries that] will 
become [EU] members 
or are interested in this 
good regulatory 
framework.” 
“The presentations contained a lot of 
important information. It was good to 
know what other countries are doing - 
ongoing projects.“ 
“Problems can  be  solved 
in different ways, and all 
are good and practical.” 
“There’s a good 
network for 
Seveso-
i t ” 
“Everyone is struggling on almost the same topics, knowing people and how they are 
dealing with certain problems sometimes helps to see the picture from a distance and 
sometimes provides you solutions.” 
“[It was important to have] competent 
officials from all over Europe – a 
networking platform for future 
knowledge exchange.” 
 
“In other EU-member states 
there are often the same 
problems like we have.” 
Figure 4 Feedback on the benefits of networking from participants 
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2.2. Follow-up and future implications 
The high participation in the training events confirmed that consequence and risk 
assessment are essential competences in chemical accident risk governance.  The 
scientific complexity of this discipline has created a high demand for tools that can 
predict the potential impacts of chemical accidents on neighboring communities, 
should they occur.  The increased frequency of extreme weather events associated 
with global warming has created a special interest in chemical accidents generated by 
natural hazard impacts.  Moreover, the ADAM and RAPID-N tools go beyond tools 
available in the marketplace to meet the specific needs of competent authorities, for 
example, particularly in terms of transparency of methods (algorithms are published) 
and manual-input for a wide diversity of fields. 
  
“Some quantitative 
risk analysis is 
interesting, so I will 
[try] to learn more 
about.” 
“[A new idea is] the 
possibility of using a 
common system for 
risk analysis …” 
“The first and obvious idea is the use of ADAM software as the main risk 
assessment tool. The software could be implemented at two levels:  ‘Light 
version’ for rough consequences calculations on the basis of information 
reported by installations to authorities.  Full version to give to the 
competent authorities an ability to calculate risks at different levels of 
accuracy and critically overview the reports presented by the industry and 
the advisors.” 
“[Follow-up could include] sharing 
experience between national 
experts through ADAM and 
RAPID–N [using] real cases and 
[examining] relative differences 
with other calculation packages” 
“Natech risks [should] be better 
addressed in the national program, 
i.e., capacity building for the 
authorities and industry, 
cooperation between Seveso 
authorities and civil protection 
authorities” 
“Hands-on trainings 
should be organized 
at home with the 
participation of the 
JRC [ADAM and 
RAPID-N]” 
 
Figure 7 Quotes from respondent evaluations about ADAM and Rapid-N training 
sessions 
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The introductory training events proved a powerful mechanism for obtaining interest 
and even excitement about the tools from many countries.  In feedback from the 
training, both from personal exchanges and evaluations, many participants expressed 
satisfaction from the introductory sessions that the tools could meet their 
consequence and risk assessment needs. (Figure 7 on Page 29 lists some comments 
that respondents provided on the training in the evaluation forms.)   
The interest and feedback regarding the tools generate d a variety of commitments as 
well as potential future work programme elements for ADAM and RAPID-N tools.  In 
particular: 
 Based on  the country’s  request,  the  JRC plans bilateral  trainings on  the  tools  in Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Israel and Ukraine across 2017‐2018, and other countries as resources allow.   
 Multilateral workshops are expected to be scheduled in 2018-2019 to  
coincide with the launching of the ADAM tool online and the new Flood module for 
RAPID-N. 
 A Train-the-Trainer for experts should be eventually developed to expand the 
trainer pool to allow the possibility of more frequent training workshops in various 
countries. 
 Needs of competent authority users will also trigger development of additional 
features and modules, such as an emergency planning module for ADAM and 
additional natural hazard modules for RAPID-N. 
 The JRC will continue to maintain and update online Help tools with staff support 
as back-up as necessary.    
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3. Performance Measurement 
This session was structured as a panel session in which each speaker had only 5 
minutes to make a presentation.  It consisted of a brief presentation outlining the 
Loss Data Initiative of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, two 
presentations from industry, and numerous presentations by national authority 
experts. 
 
3.1. Highlights from the session 
Of the considerable information provided across presentations, the following points 
represent some of the main highlights. 
The majority of safety performance measurement systems in use today only 
follow – rather than lead – safety.  This situations needs to change. There is 
still tremendous work ahead in establishing appropriate measures and systems for 
collecting data to assess safety performance and drive prevention improvements.  
They are not proactive in identifying increased risk.   Performance is often equated 
with accidents reported, a lagging indicator that also excludes near misses and 
accidents on sites and within activities outside the reporting regime (e.g., Seveso).  
 
Why Safety Performance Measurement is a Priority Topic 
Safety performance measures to support chemical accident risk management has 
been an accepted part of chemical process safety management  for a few decades, 
promoted by prominent organizations such as the OECD and the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety in the late 1990s and 2000s.  In the aftermath of the BP 
Texas City accident of 2005, the concept has become mainstream process safety in 
both government and industry.  Establishing meaningful performance measures for 
industrial processes can be both a complex and dynamic exercise.  The data should 
generate relevant and timely feedback for improving safety that can be converted 
into recommendations for action.   Increasingly, governments are also establishing 
performance measures, to evaluate effectiveness of regulation and their own 
efforts to enforce it. 
What This Session Aimed to Discuss 
We cannot improve what we cannot measure.  How do we know if we are reducing 
chemical accident risks?  Do we have the right tools to measure this? This is a 
panel session that will explore what measures are currently available for the EU, 
national authorities and industry to measure safety performance in reducing 
chemical accident risks.  This session seeks to answer the following key questions: 
What do these measures say about industry process safety performance?  What 
are the things they can’t tell us?  Is the picture clear and complete?  What kind of 
leading indicators could be used to predict safety performance trends across 
industry? What are some possible options for obtaining more accurate and 
complete statistics on EU performance in reducing chemical accident risks? 
2017 Ch
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partners, including the EU, it is working towards a uniform set of indicators for 
collecting loss data from all types of natural and technological disasters.    
Countries that have not implemented Seveso, or a Seveso-like programme 
are for the most part looking at different safety performance metrics than 
their EU counterparts.  Pre-Seveso countries are looking at whether they are 
sufficiently enabled to manage their chemical accident risks.  These kinds of measures 
include having an inventory of all major hazard sites, having a complete set of 
legislation in place to manage the risks, whether competent staff are available and 
operational systems have been established to support implementation of the 
legislation. 
3.2. Future implications and potential follow-up 
Pursuant to the meeting the CARS Steering Committee met to discuss what ideas 
could be taken forward from the presentations in this session.  The Committee made 
the following observations. 
 There is still a long way to go in obtaining leading indicators of 
performance trends in hazardous industries.  The CEFIC/ICCA metrics are a 
positive step forward towards indicators.  The chemical industry has conducted 
extensive research and elaborated concrete guidance in order to help their 
memberships.  The current chemical industry initiative to make certain measures 
public is important, particularly for transparency and stimulating dialogue in the 
public domain.   
 However, many other hazardous industries have yet to take a similar 
commitment.  Moreover, a majority of sites still struggle with how to select and 
use safety performance indicators as true performance measures.  Similarly, 
competent authorities struggle with how to evaluate these efforts on their Seveso 
sites. 
 Without leading indicators, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify 
government resources aimed at chemical accident prevention and 
preparedness as the years go by and no major accidents occur.  While the 
reporting of major accidents in eMARS is invaluable for recording and exchanging 
lessons learned, it is not adequate for performance measurement. Moreover, EU 
governments, with some exceptions, have not been aggressively seeking to adopt 
proactive safety metrics to identify trends and emerging risks for themselves.  
More varied forms of measurement are needed to reflect the government’s 
impact.  
 In particular, high-consequence, low-frequency accidents are not measures of 
performance.  
 Secondly, the full impacts of the accidents that are reported are not recorded, 
if they are even measured at all (or known). 
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 Implementation of site-based measurement by competent authorities as 
leading indicators for emerging risks could be further explored.  More 
varied forms of measurement are needed to reflect the government’s impact.  
Implementation of site-based measurement by competent authorities as leading 
indicators for emerging risks could be further explored.  Some countries (e.g., 
Norway, the United Kingdom) are already leading the way in this regard.   
 For pre-Seveso countries, national hazardous site inventories and 
incident reporting systems are essential building blocks of national safety 
performance monitoring. Preliminary evaluations of known hazardous sites 
(through questionnaires and/or site visits) can also be a positive step towards 
establishing a baseline for measuring progress.   
The results of these discussions indicate that some potential areas of future 
collaboration exchange could be: 
1) Experimentation and collaboration between governments on various types 
of indicators could be particularly useful, notably: 
 Measures that provide input as to whether government programmes to reduce 
chemical accidents are working generally across the economy.  Loss data are one 
type of measure that could be useful for this purpose.  Taking this forward would 
imply that data collected may have to have lower thresholds than existing 
schemes and cover a wider range of impacts.  There are probably some countries 
that are collecting these data that could be used as models.  
 
 So-called “bottom-up” indicators that give feedback on site specific conditions.  
These measures would provide input to inspection strategy and could also 
promote constructive dialogue on improvements between government and 
industry, as noted the United Kingdom and Norway examples.   Instruments such 
as safety culture surveys and other similar questionnaires used by some EU 
inspectorates are already going in this direction. 
2) Exploration and testing of measurements that evaluate the impacts of 
inspection and other enforcement and compliance measures. Some specific 
feedback that would be useful includes: 
 How effective are Seveso inspections? 
 How does enforcement vary across the EU in terms of approach, intensity and outcome? 
 How well do other government enforcement and compliance measures work, 
e.g., fines , guidance, etc.? 
 Does impact of inspection and other measures vary depending on the type of 
company, and if so, what are the key variables in this regard, e.g., the type of 
activity, safety culture, size? 
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3) In light of these observations, it is also relevant for pre-Seveso countries to 
establish a baseline to evaluate progress as more rigorous measures are 
implemented.  Full implementation and resourcing of the main obligations of the 
Seveso Directive could be relevant indicators, for example.20 
 
 
3.3. Additional sources of information 
 CEFIC Guidance on Process Safety Indicators     
http://www.cefic.org/Industry‐support/Responsible‐Care‐tools‐SMEs/3‐Plant‐‐Process‐
Safety/Cefic‐Guidance‐on‐Process‐Safety‐Indicators/  
 
 OECD Guidance on Developing Process Safety Indicators   
https://www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/chemical‐accidents/41269639.pdf   
 
 OECD Corporate governance for process safety: Guidance for senior leaders in high hazard 
industries 
http://www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/corporategovernanceforprocesssafety.htm  
  
                                          
20 The JRC Survey of Seveso Implementation in Neighbourhood Countries aimed to 
establish a baseline for each country within the Seveso Directive context. 
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/shorturl/minerva/seveso_enpi_project_outputs  
Conclusion: There appears to be a need for focused government exchange 
and collaboration on collection of data to support macro and micro-safety 
performance measurement of chemical accident risk governance.  This topic 
should be taken up in the various forums where governments meet and discuss how 
to address challenges in monitoring and oversight of hazardous industries. 
 
For pre-Seveso countries, national hazardous site inventories and incident 
reporting systems are essential building blocks of national safety performance 
monitoring. Preliminary evaluations of known hazardous sites (through 
questionnaires and/or site visits) can also be a positive step towards establishing a 
baseline for measuring progress.       
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4. Integrity of Installations and Equipment (Mechanical 
Integrity) 
This session consisted of 8 presentations from government experts.  The topics 
ranged from a monitoring and performance measurement system for ageing plants 
(already mentioned in Session 1), analyses of accidents involving mechanical integrity 
failures, highlights of good practice and findings from inspections, and two case 
studies associated with risk management and communication of risks on ammonia 
storage sites. 
 
 
Why Mechanical Integrity is a Priority Topic 
The core principle of chemical process safety is to avoid a loss of containment, that 
is, an unplanned release of a dangerous substance.  Mechanical integrity failures 
remain a prominent factor in chemical accident and near-miss occurrences, serving 
often as primary causes as well as contributing factors in the sequence of events. 
of chemical accidents and incidents.  Core elements of a mechanical integrity  
program are monitoring, inspection, testing and maintenance at appropriate 
intervals and in response to system feedback of relevant equipment, including 1) 
pipes, vessels and tanks in order to avoid spontaneous leakage or ruptures, 2) 
process controls to ensure the prevalence of safe operating conditions, and 3) 
safety instrumentation and emergency response systems designed to contain 
impacts should process failures occur. Ensuring that the site’s mechanical integrity 
programmes are sufficiently controlling process risks is an ongoing concern for 
operators and inspectors alike. Maintenance activities are particularly vulnerable to 
cost-cutting measures when profit margins are down.   In addition, efforts to 
maintain integrity can be undermined by uncertainties associated with factors such 
as aging, quality of repairs and replacement, process change, and lack of 
equipment documentation. 
What This Session Aimed to Discuss 
Hazardous sites should ensure ongoing mechanical integrity for systems and their 
critical components, both containment of hazardous substances inside the 
equipment and/or critical lines and the proper functioning of critical safety systems 
during all phases of the plant life cycle: design, installation and start-up, operation 
and maintenance, shut-down, cleaning and decommissioning.  This session sought 
answers to a number of questions to have a view of current strengths and 
weaknesses in mechanical integrity management on hazardous sites. What are 
major / typical findings from recent inspections and accident investigations and 
what kind of actions have been undertaken? How do integrity challenges affect 
small sized establishments (especially in small companies or with simple 
processes, like LPG storage)? How can the new requirements of the Directive be 
interpreted in relation to mechanical integrity of equipment and control and 
monitoring of plant ageing?  How can Seveso competent authorities/industry 
groups promote better integrity management on major hazard sites?  How is 
industry addressing planning and foresight on integrity in new design? 
2017 Ch
 
4.1.
A main o
that is, m
for safe
was raise
Some ke
Hazardo
site.  Th
or exace
often fai
operation
particula
rigorous,
owners. 
 
F
(J
 
 
 
emical Accid
High
bservation 
echanica
ty perform
d in both s
y messages
us sites s
ere continu
rbated by, 
l to address
al and m
r risk for ol
 or docum
 
igure 10  Re
ulie Sharman
ent Risks S
lights f
from this s
l integrity 
ance.  Not
essions. (Se
 drawn from
hould set 
e to be nu
wrong assu
 these sign
aintenance 
der plants (
entation w
sults of pe
 United King
eminar and
rom the 
ession was
is one of 
ably, the H
e Figure 1
 this sessi
up an asse
merous acc
mptions ab
ificant gaps
history of
> 10 years)
as lost ove
rformance 
dom Health 
 Training W
session
 that it was
the most 
SE present
0 below.) 
on are desc
ts registe
idents that
out the eq
 in docume
 critical eq
, because r
r time, or
measureme
and Safety E
orkshop  
 
 linked stro
influential
ation on its
ribed below
r of all cri
 fundament
uipment inv
ntation of s
uipment.  
ules of doc
 was neve
nt program
xecutive, CA
ngly with S
 leading in
 ageing pla
: 
tical equip
ally were c
olved.    C
pecification
This situa
umentation
r passed o
me for age
RS 2017) 
ession 1, 
dicators 
nt metrics 
ment on 
aused by, 
ompanies 
s and the 
tion is a 
 were less 
n to new 
ing plants 
38 
  
 39  2017 Chemical Accident Risks Seminar and Training Workshop 
 
Using accurate information on equipment and process dynamics is essential 
to assuring appropriate use and maintenance of equipment to avoid failure.   
This information typically consists of age, function and specifications of critical 
equipment. The appropriate performance degradation rates should be incorporated 
into calculation of maintenance intervals for each piece or section of equipment. In 
addition, the kind of degradation phenomena and static/dynamic stresses that may 
affect material compatibility with operating conditions.    
A strong mechanical integrity programme can be demonstrated to the public and 
politicians, and provide evidence of good risk management.  For some substances, 
such as ammonia, Public doubts and/or political awareness about mechanical integrity 
of hazardous sites have surfaced with large ammonia storage tanks near urban areas 
in various countries (Israel, Norway, Slovakia).   
Ammonia is an essential ingredient to many industrial processes and having storage 
sites within the country gives economic advantages in many cases.  In Norway, the 
uncertainty surrounding the risk level associated with a very large ammonia storage 
tank stoked public concern.  However, a structural examination of the tank produced 
convincing evidence that the risk of an ammonia release were very low and elevated 
public trust. 
4.2.  Future implications and potential follow-up 
Pursuant to the meeting the CARS Steering Committee met to discuss what ideas 
could be taken forward from the presentations in this session.  The Committee made 
the following observations. 
Mechanical integrity is still a main cause of concern on hazardous sites in 
Europe and neighbouring countries.  For example, the UK programme measuring 
performance of ageing plants revealed that > 70% of sites are managing their asset 
risks adequately.  Italy appeared to have considerable findings from inspections 
related to mechanical integrity as well.   Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) 
seem to have particular difficulties (e.g., due to lack of specific competence, lack of 
resources, and heavy reliance on external technical organizations.) 
Risk assessments and risk-based decisions are often constructed on false 
assumptions about mechanical integrity, as evidenced by recurring accidents 
involving mechanical failures on sites with supposedly robust risk management 
programmes.  Age, changes in ownership, profitability loss of corporate history can 
sometimes obscure mechanical weaknesses.  Sometimes sites will be accustomed to 
working with insufficient knowledge or inadequate conditions leading to complacency 
about the risks.  It is essential that hazardous sites maintain complete asset registers 
for safety-critical processes. 
Failure to recognise mechanical vulnerabilities has an enormous impact on 
the safety of the entire process.  Mechanical failures can initiate or accelerate the 
accident sequence.  Potential vulnerabilities in critical systems can include 
containment equipment (e.g., pipes and vessels), control measures and 
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instrumentation (safety valves, alarms, etc.), and common services (e.g., 
generators). 
Effective management of site integrity is a good story for business and for 
the public.  Insufficient mechanical integrity leaves sites very vulnerable to losing 
their right to operate in the face of a serious incident or concerned citizens and 
politicians.  Conversely, a proactive mechanical integrity programme can often be a 
selling point in risk communication.  Moreover, the costs of critical equipment failure, 
especially potential collateral damage, create a clear business case for a mechanical 
integrity programme as a key component of a loss prevention strategy. 
 
4.3. Additional sources of information 
 OECD Ageing of Hazardous Installations  
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=env/jm/
mono(2017)9&doclanguage=en  
 
 UK. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) .  Ageing Plant Operational Delivery Guide 
Ageing Plant Operational Delivery Guide. Control of Major Accident Hazards 
(COMAH).  
http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/guidance/ageing-plant-core.pdf 
The UK HSE has several other ageing plant guides for operators on its site at 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/ - Search on “ageing plants”  
 
 INERIS. 2009. International Benchmark on regulations and practices as regards 
managing industrial installation ageing. Study Report N° DRA-09-102957-07985C. 
http://www.ineris.fr/centredoc/ageing-web.pdf (English)  
http://www.ineris.fr/centredoc/benchmark-vieillissement-general-web.pdf 
Conclusion:  Many accident scenarios feature mechanical integrity as the 
critical factor, or “weak link” in process safety.  For this reason, it is difficult 
to justify making broad assumptions about system integrity of safety-critical 
processes when parts of the system have not been evaluated or degraded 
conditions of some parts are ignored.  Risk assessments should be based on 
realistic and informed evaluations of system integrity.   
The impacts of systematic approaches to assessing site mechanical 
integrity should be evaluated over time.  The technique works on the 
assumptions that measurement motivates better performance. Tangible results 
could motivate more competent authorities and operators to adopt this approach. 
Mechanical integrity is also assumed to be a leading indicator for safety 
performance.  Systematic assessment of site mechanical integrity could become 
also be used as a performance trend measurement for government and industry 
alike.       
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(French)  
 
 Mansfield, D., T. Atkinson and J. Worsley, 2012. The importance of recognising 
and managing ageing plants. Symposium Series No. 158 Hazards XXIII. IChemE.  
https://www.icheme.org/~/media/Documents/Subject%20Groups/Safety_Loss_Pr
evention/Hazards%20Archive/XXIII/XXIII-Paper-56.pdf  
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5. IT Security and Safety Challenges  
This session was a double session that looked at both security and safety risks with 
increased integration of IT technology in hazardous site operations.  It consisted of 11 
presentations from a mix of industry, national authorities and the research 
community (represented by the JRC). The presentations were varied and 
complementary, with some providing problem analysis and case studies, others 
describing some of the solutions underway to resolve the emerging challenges. 
 
5.1.  Highlights from the session 
For many participants, this session represented a basic and well overdue education in 
understanding the potential impacts of a new generation of production that is heavily 
dependent on information technology.  Key messages drawn from this session are 
described below: 
The opportunities represented by advances in information technology also 
bring new technological challenges. For all industries, these innovations create 
Why Cyber Safety and Security is a Priority Topic 
The use of new technologies introduces new and unforeseen risks.  The significant 
advances in information technology in the past two decades has launched a 
revolution in manufacturing as process automation increasingly takes over more 
and more process operations. Companies are increasingly investing in internal 
information technology that connects their networks of sensors and actuators for 
data collection and monitoring to optimize production processes and automate 
routine process decisions.  According to a recent report by McKinsey and Company 
on emerging and disruptive technologies*, this technology application, often 
referred to as the “Internet of Things” will add trillions of Euros of added value to 
the world economy by 2025.  Many industries will increase IT dependencies in 
other areas, such as advanced robotics and cloud technology (computer hardware 
and software delivered over the Internet).  It is evident that companies and entire 
industries will need to rethink and rewrite hazard assessments to reflect new 
process considerations, including large scale process interconnectivity, remote 
control from longer and longer distances, and software and hardware integrity. 
What This Session Aimed to Discuss 
The session sought to understand whether ongoing innovations in the use of IT 
technology for operation of major hazard sites make major hazard sites more 
vulnerable to cyber attacks than they were 5 or 10 years ago?   Can they introduce 
additional risk factors affecting process safety on major hazard sites?  Why or why 
not? What are companies doing to protect their sites from cyber attacks or 
increased safety risks and what are vulnerable industry groups doing to help their 
sites reduce these risks?  What tools and approaches can the Seveso competent 
authority use to motivate sites to take action to reduce IT-related safety and 
security risks at their sites? Compared to other risks, how relevant and how 
serious are IT risks for a hazardous site? 
*Manyika, J., M. Chui, J. Bughin, R. Dobbs, P. Bisson, and A. Marrs. 2013. Disruptive technologies: 
Advances that will transform life, business, and the global economy. McKinsey Global Institute. 
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new types of demands on resources and introduce new security risks. (An example of 
how control systems may be used on chemical plants is shown in Figure 11 on page 
45.)  Notable changes in the traditional business model stem in large part because:  
 Industrial control systems are not isolated anymore  
 Modern industrial control systems are communicating over the Internet 
 Industrial control systems are running generic operating systems  
These aspects have notable implications for chemical accident risks at hazardous 
facilities, in particular, increased potential for common cause failure as well as the 
possibility that hacking the system could result in a potential release of hazardous 
substances.    
Industrial control systems introduce safety risks as well as security risks 
that have implications for both design and maintenance of these systems.  
Risk managers will have to include hazard analysis in a number of relatively new 
areas associated with the use of information technology, such as: 
 design of interfaces between new and “old” IT systems,  
 integrity of IT system components and functions,  
 software and equipment life cycles, and  
 risks associated with maintenance and updates to hardware and software 
 risks associated with remote operation of plants 
A case study of the Mongstad refinery incident (October 2016) given by the 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety (PSA) gave evidence that IT failure coupled with 
interconnectivity of process operations across a common network can launch a series 
of events leading to an accident. 
Site safety management systems may not reflect an awareness of safety 
risks associated with implementation of IT innovations.  Industrial control 
systems are a new source of common cause failure.  It has also has profound 
implications for management of change.   
As noted in the presentation from the Norwegian PSA, elements that may need to be 
elaborated in an SMS may include such items as: 
 risk assessment of threats within the IT domain,  
 IT architecture and interfaces with other IT systems,  
 passive protective measures,  
 monitoring, analysis and response related to cyber irregularities 
 procedures for reporting cyber vulnerabilities and near‐misses 
 auditing of IT systems for safety risks 
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geographic distribution, interconnectivity between plants, size of remotely 
operated plants, etc.  
 Good risk management practice specific to remote sites, such as minimum 
response time; coping with loss of power; Internet access and hacking; and 
manual functionality and overrides necessary in the case of failures or 
emergencies. 
There are a number of initiatives implemented or underway both in the 
European Union and internationally to address security vulnerabilities 
associated with industrial control systems.  The Directive on security of network 
and information systems (NIS Directive) (EU 2016/1148) and the current proposal to 
strengthen standardization and certification activities within the EU agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA) represent significant steps forward in 
establishing a strong cybersecurity framework in Europe.  (EU efforts to strengthen 
standardization and certification have subsequently become more visible within the 
proposal for regulation COM/2017/0477 final/2 issued on 4.10.2017.21) 
5.2.  Future implications and potential follow-up 
Pursuant to the meeting the CARS Steering Committee met to discuss what ideas 
could be taken forward from the presentations in this session.  The Committee made 
the following observations. 
Awareness and identification of risks associated with advanced industrial 
control systems is lagging behind its implementation.  The Norwegian PSA 
study indicated that, while some operators understand the threat and are working 
towards integration of cyber risks in their risk management approach, others do not 
have a risk assessment approach at all.   
There will need to be close and ongoing collaboration directed at 
incorporating process risk management in industrial controlling systems.  
Designers of industrial control systems speak a different language than process 
engineers.  Overcoming professional and cultural barriers are likely to remain a 
significant challenge in this regard for years to come.  
In the EU, knowledge and tools to support inspections and oversight of cyber 
safety and security at EU Seveso sites are not widely available.  The seminar 
represents one of the first occasions where industry and government have exchanged 
good practice and experience in this regard.  It is still somewhat early to understand 
the full implications of cyber security and automation with process safety for Seveso 
inspections.  For example, it was discussed that some competent authorities may 
require support from an IT expert resource to support Seveso enforcement and 
oversight at sites with advanced industrial controls systems. Security clearance could 
                                          
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the "EU 
Cybersecurity Agency", and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and 
Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (''Cybersecurity Act'') 
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also be a requirement for inspectors at some sites.  Ongoing exchanges with industry 
and the cyber community should help to evolve effective approaches over time. 
The number of remotely operated sites should be expected to increase in 
future.  Lack of a strategy and criteria in the face of a rapid increase would result an 
ad hoc approach to risk management creating potentially serious risk management 
gaps on individual sites.  Without any precedents or standard models to follow, 
competent authorities may be very vulnerable to legal challenges should they choose 
to confront operators on risk management issues.  
 
 
 
  
Conclusions:  There needs to be more discussion among competent 
authorities and industry on cyber safety and security risks and practical 
exchange of good practice and experience.  Whether competent authorities need to 
address cyber security interfaces with process safety remains an open question. 
Exchange between authorities overseeing safety and those overseeing security 
matters could also be explored as a way of monitoring these interfaces.   
Competent authorities needs some basic rules and criteria as a starting 
point for addressing cyber safety and security in inspections and when reviewing 
sites and installations for permits or commissioning. A simple set of principles will 
be particularly helpful to small countries and pre-Seveso countries.  Eventually, 
more comprehensive guidance may emerge in national authorities as they gain 
knowledge and experience. 
EU authorities will likely have to develop consistent approaches to 
overseeing industrial control systems and remotely operated sites.   Issues 
such as minimum safety requirements and inspection strategies and tools may 
benefit from agreement on common approaches at EU level.  Collaboration on 
monitoring and enforcement may require standardization and international 
collaboration.  Criteria may need to be developed for acceptance of remotely 
operated sites.  Bilateral and multilateral agreements between countries may need 
to be established as already exists for other cross-national hazards such as 
pipelines. 
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5.3. Additional sources of information 
International Standards 
 IEC 61511‐2. Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector 
– Part 2: Guidelines for the application of IEC 61511‐1   
(https://webstore.iec.ch/p‐preview/info_iec61511‐2%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf)  
 BS IEC 62443. Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security.   
(http://isa99.isa.org/Public/Information/The‐62443‐Series‐Overview.pdf) 
 EEMUA Information sheet 2. Cyber security assessment process for industrial control systems 
(https://www.eemua.org/EEMUAPortalSite/media/EEMUA‐Flyers/EEMUA‐Industry‐
Information‐Sheet‐2.pdf)  
European Union  
 The Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive)   
(https://ec.europa.eu/digital‐single‐market/en/network‐and‐information‐security‐nis‐
directive)  
 ENISA, the EU agency for Network and Information Security   (https://www.enisa.europa.eu/)  
 European IACS components Cybersecurity Certification Framework (ICCF)   (https://erncip‐
project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/introduction‐european‐iacs‐components‐cybersecurity‐
certification‐framework‐iccf)  
Norway 
 NOROG  104  Recommended  guidelines  for  information  security  baseline  requirements  for 
process  control,  safety  and  support  ICT  systems,  NEW  REVISION  05122016 
(https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/Publica/Guidelines/Integrated‐operations/104‐
Recommended‐guidelines‐for‐information‐security‐baseline‐requirements‐for‐process‐
control‐safety‐and‐support‐ICT‐systems/)   
 A guideline based on ISO 27002 and adjusted for OT environment 
United Kingdom 
 HSE  Operational  Guidance.  Cyber  Security  for  Industrial  Automation  and  Control  Systems 
(IACS). (http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/og/og‐0086.pdf)  
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United States 
 NIST Special Publication 800-82 Revision 2 Guide to Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
82r2.pdf)  
 
 Chemical Sector Cyber Security Framework   
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/framework_guidance/chemical-
framework-implementation-guide-2015-508.pdf  
Industry and academia 
 Charpentier, J-C.   2015. What kind of Modern « green» Chemical Engineering is 
required for the Design of the « Factory of Future »? Symphosium 2015. 3rd 
International Symposium on Innovation and Technology in the Phosphate Industry 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705816004689#abs0005  
 Charpentier, J-C.   2010. Among the trends for a modern chemical engineering, 
the third paradigm: The time and length multiscale approach as an efficient tool 
for process intensification and product design and engineering . Chemical 
Engineering Research and Design 88 (2010) 248-254 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0263876209000732  
 Gani, R. 2008. Integrated Chemical Product-Process Design: CAPE Perspectives .  
Computer Aided Process Engineering (CAPE).  ISBN: 3-527-30804-0. Wiley Online 
Library http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9783527619856.fmatter/pdf  
 Potier, B.  2015.  Air liquide digital policy/approach. Air Liquide Keynote at 
Financial Times Manufacturing.  FT Live. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LC6Egjyuyug)  
 C. B. Frey and M. A. Osborne.  2013. The future of employment: how many jobs 
are susceptible to computerisation? University of Oxford.  Oxford Martin School. 
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employm
ent.pdf  
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6. Organizational Change and Influence of Enforcement 
This session consisted of presentations aimed to identify and address challenges 
associated with organizational change, and in particular, change of ownership, that 
can have a dramatic influence on the safety of hazardous sites. This session consisted 
of 4 presentations from national experts, and one each from experts from industry 
and academia.  
 
 
6.1.  Highlights from the session 
The presentations on this topic had some clear links to other topics in the seminar, 
especially with mechanical integrity, and to some extent also cyber safety and 
security. Key messages drawn from this session are described below: 
Challenges remain in managing the volume and pace of organizational 
change in our time (e.g., economically driven changes, IT systems).  In industry, 
change is often a function of effective business management implemented through a 
proactive strategy.   In some cases, change is forced by external factors, such as 
regulation or competition, in which case the strategy may be reactive.   
In many countries, change of ownership of one or more hazardous sites is a common 
occurrence, particularly, in the chemical industries.  Most, if not all, countries have 
Why Organizational Change is a Priority Topic 
Over its lifetime sites, can undergo diverse phases of organizational changes, the 
most common are changes stemming from economic downturn and ownership 
change.  There is ample evidence from past accident history that failure to control 
ownership change risks can have long term impacts on overall site safety 
performance.  However, there are a number of other kinds of organizational 
changes that elevate risks, including changes that dramatically alter work 
processes, such as outsourcing and digitization of operations.  Multi-operator sites, 
such as industrial parks and joint ventures, can also create new risk management 
challenges where responsibility and accountability for some safety critical 
operations, such as emergency response and maintenance and common 
infrastructure, are distributed. 
What This Session Aimed to Discuss 
This session examined how organisational change may affect process safety risks 
on major hazard sites and what government and industry can do to reduce 
potential risk from organizational change.  Key questions that were addressed 
include:  Do site managers know that organizational changes may also affect the 
plant safety and must be evaluated in the SMS? What impacts do ownership 
change, staff reductions, re-organisation, reduction in competency requirements, 
joint ventures, and general drives for more efficient production affect process 
safety? How can competent authorities identify when sites are at risk because of 
organizational change? How can competent authorities influence sites to evaluate 
and address process safety risks due to organizational change? 
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experienced change of ownership associated with a hazardous site over the last 
several years.   It is not uncommon that the change strategy overlooks the effects of 
organizational change on process safety.  Failure to analyze these impacts in time can 
result in a weakened defense against major accidents. For example, industry 
implementation of government actions to improve safety can temporarily reduce its 
capacity to manage exposure to the risks in question.  
 
 
 
Figure 13  Relationships and responsibilities of stakeholders in change of ownership (R. 
Larsen, Norwegian Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, CARS 2017) 
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Colocation of hazardous activities in industrial zones and complexes has 
many economic advantages because of the efficiencies it offers in terms of 
delivery of services, supplies, and even people to the sites.  Moreover, in highly 
populated regions, such as Malta, there may also be risk management benefits in 
concentrating hazardous industries in pockets of land away from urban areas.  
Attractive coastal areas of seas and rivers, often collocated in the heart of a major 
city, can come under particular pressure in countries with growing activity in the oil 
and gas industries.   
While industrial complexes bring benefits, these configurations can also 
create internal risk management challenges.  The integrity and operations of 
interfaces between establishments, common infrastructure, and safety control 
measures must be somehow jointly managed by different operators to prevent 
accidents and mitigate their effects.  The competent authorities sometimes face 
situations where the legal responsibilities of each party are unclear, and often have to 
use their influence to drive sites to make more coherent and reliable arrangements. 
6.2.  Future implications and potential follow-up 
Pursuant to the meeting the CARS Steering Committee met to discuss what ideas 
could be taken forward from the presentations in this session.  The Committee made 
the following observations: 
 
The OECD upcoming guidance on ownership change of hazardous sites 
provides an important new practical tool for operators and government. It 
also represents the first time that the expert community has examined mergers and 
acquisitions in the chemical industries as a site risk management issue and provided 
concrete evidence and guidance in this regard.  Notably, the EU chemical industry has 
expressly recommended the use of this tool by companies involved in site acquisition 
and divestiture. Every effort should be made to disseminate the guidance as broadly 
as possible in the coming years. 
Industrial parks are a particular organizational structure that has long been 
considered as an important mechanism for catalyzing economic growth in 
emerging economies.  The concentration of activities lowers infrastructure costs 
and transaction costs may also be lowered when business partners are located on the 
same site.  Indeed, many Neighbourhood Countries, such as Algeria, Israel, Jordan, 
Palestine, Tunisia, and Ukraine, have several industrial parks.22  Nonetheless, they 
pose particular challenges for risk management in terms of assigning accountability 
and ensuring appropriate oversight of common services that can affect safety.  
Depending on the proportion of hazardous facilities on site, some industrial parks may 
be vulnerable to domino effects once an accident sequence is triggered.  
 
                                          
22 According to responses to the 2015 JRC Survey of EU Neighbourhood Countries on Chemical Accident 
Prevention and Preparedness Programmes. 
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Work outsourced to contractors continues to be a risk factor on many 
hazardous sites, in particular, since outsourcing of many functions plays a 
fundamental role in the business models of many hazardous industries.  In 
2012 a JRC study revealed that subcontractors were a factor in nearly 6% of incidents 
in the eMARS database. The study also showed that EU major accidents involving 
contractors had increased dramatically in recent years, rising from a yearly average of 
1.1 between 1991-2000 to 3.4 per year from 2000-2010.  The accident at the BASF 
site in Ludwigshafen, Germany of October 2016 gives evidence that contractor 
management requires constant attention.   
 
Conclusions:  The OECD Guidance on Ownership Change at Hazardous 
Sites should be disseminated widely and its implementation should be closely 
followed.  It may be important to assess the impacts of the guidance and whether 
there are new lessons learned from implementation. 
Further exchange on risk management of industrial parks and joint ventures may 
be particularly valuable for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries.  Tools such 
as ADAM and RAPID-N can also support consequence and risk assessment for 
aggregated risks from hazardous sites in industrial parks. 
Changes in government organizations, or in government requirements, 
also merit preparatory analysis of impacts prior to implementation.  Re-
organization of government services, loss of staff competence, and modifications 
to legal requirements, are changes whose impact on both government and industry 
performance may need to be assessed and addressed as appropriate. Capacity 
building for pending alignment with the Seveso Directive in Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood country are changes that have greater chance of success if planned 
and calibrated over time in consideration of individual country strengths and 
limitations. 
Part of change management is also managing expectations.  Gathering 
information on the current situation can aid management and staff to develop a 
common in understanding of what could change.  From here, they can map a 
common strategy to avoid that certain changes do not become accident triggers. 
There are a wide range of other types of organizational changes that can 
influence site risk, such as the impacts of staff reductions, joint ventures, and 
major structural reorganization on risk management of hazardous sites. The 
seminar did not include presentations on all the relevant topics simply because 
they were not proposed.  Indeed, the topic has become quite large and it is likely 
that much more exchange on organizational change is necessary to give attention 
to all the issues and identify innovations in monitoring and management that help 
to mitigate their disadvantages. 
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The seminar did not include presentations on other organizational change 
issues, in particular, the impacts of staff reductions, joint ventures, and major 
structural reorganization on risk management of hazardous sites.   
 
Organizational change is not just an issue for industry.  The ability of 
government to oversee and enforce effective risk management on hazardous sites can 
also be compromised by organizational changes and reduced staff resources in 
government institutions.   
 
Capacity building to achieve high standard of risk governance requires 
significant changes in government and industry.  Meaningful progress usually 
requires gaining access or investing in new competencies, launching or augmenting of 
support services, often accompanied by structural re-organization.  There is a 
question as to how much  stakeholders in pre-Seveso countries, as well as their 
external partners, take account of these factors in planning capacity building 
activities, developing legislation, and establishing timelines for implementation. 
 
6.3.  Additional sources of information 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2017. Synthesis 
report: Special session on facilities handling hazardous substances with ownership 
change.  
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=env/jm/mon
o(2016)10&doclanguage=en  
 
OECD guidance on facilities handling hazardous substances undergoing ownership 
change.  Publication pending. 
 
European Commission Joint Research Centre. JRC Lessons Learned Bulletin no.2 
Major accidents involving contractors. A collaboration of the EC Joint Research Centre 
and EU Member State Competent Authorities within the EU Technical Working Group 
for Seveso Inspections (TWG 2). JRC 77996.  
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/EN/content/minerva/fb542ac7-0bfe-437b-8ece-
3af05d5dc943/llb02contractorspdf 
 
European Commission Joint Research Centre and Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection. 2012. EU Seveso Inspection Series. Chemical hazards risk management in 
industrial parks and domino effect establishments: Key points and conclusions for 
Seveso Directive enforcement and implementation.  In collaboration with the EU 
Technical Working Group for Seveso Inspections (TWG 2). 
1) Short report (JRC80649):   
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/EN/content/minerva/e627c9fb-aab2-4122-bf18-
9421cf87b442/sis05shortrmindustrialparksanddominopdf  
2) Workshop proceedings ( EUR 25664 EN – 2012). 
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/EN/content/minerva/29254184-bf7a-46d9-89ba-
402ce5263e14/sis05rmindustrialparksanddominopdf  
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European Process Safety Centre. 2003.  Process Safety and Risk Management of 
Chemical Parks.  A report by the European Process Safety Centre in conjunction with 
the Center for Chemical Process Safety 
https://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/embedded-pdf/Chemical%20Parks.pdf  
 
Dambmann, D. and L. Allford. 2003. A walk in the chemical park. IChemE Hazards 
XVII Symposium.  Symposium Series 149.  
https://www.icheme.org/communities/subject_groups/safety%20and%20loss%20pre
vention/resources/hazards%20archive/~/media/Documents/Subject%20Groups/Safet
y_Loss_Prevention/Hazards%20Archive/XVII/XVII-Paper-54.pdf  
 
European Commission.  2014. EU Common Inspection Criteria Bulletin No. 2.  Permit-
to-Work.  A collaboration of the EC Joint Research Centre and EU Member State 
Competent Authorities within the EU Technical Working Group for Seveso Inspections 
(TWG 2). JRC93841. 
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/EN/content/minerva/ce714a82-a805-4705-abcf-
9151beec88a5/cic_issue_2_permit_to_work  
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7. Substance Classification and Identification of Hazardous 
Sites 
This session consisted of 9 presentations from government and industry experts.  The 
session mainly focused on challenges in applying Seveso substance criteria to identify 
major hazard sites when the substances involved do not have EU harmonized 
classifications.  Pre-Seveso countries, that is Enlargement and EU Neighbourhood 
countries, also described how they were working towards the use of Seveso substance 
or other criteria to identify major hazard sites in their countries. 
 
Why Substance Criteria for Major Hazard Identification is a Priority Topic 
The Seveso Directive has established criteria for identifying Seveso sites on the 
basis of minimum quantities of toxic, flammable and explosive substances, as 
classified in accordance with the EU CLP Directive (Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008). 
Many of these substances have EU harmonized classifications listed in Annex VI of 
the EU CLP Regulation but they are minimum classifications and therefore, they 
can be challenged.  However, there remain numerous substances whose status is 
determined via self-classification by the manufacturer.  The open-ended nature of 
classification under the EU CLP regulation can create significant challenges in 
interpreting substance criteria for Seveso implementation, including self-
classification of the same non-harmonized substance by different manufacturers, 
classification and downstream legislation decisions involving harmonized 
substances with non-harmonized classifications, potential disputes regarding the 
minimum harmonized classification, inconsistencies in safety data sheets from 
different producers, and similar issues.    
Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries that are in the process of identifying 
their hazardous sites also face other difficulties. Without Seveso or similar 
legislation, precise data on substances present on sites may not be available, and 
countries may use other information to identify major hazard sites.  Some 
countries are in the process of updating their classification systems, to the EU or 
GHS1 classifications, and are therefore undergoing a transition process.   
What This Session Aimed to Discuss 
This session sought presentations that would identify and discuss solutions to 
cases in which EU/EU-affiliate countries faced ambiguous and/or conflicting 
substance classifications under the EU CLP regulation in trying to determine a site’s 
Seveso status. Other questions were also of interest to discuss, in particular:  Is 
there consistency across EU/EU-affiliate countries in approaches to the same or 
similar cases?  If not, should there be and if so, how could this be achieved? How 
can countries share and notify each other about changes in self-classifications?   
A more general discussion of how to identify hazardous sites was also targeted, 
particularly what methods countries can use, other than the Seveso substance 
criteria to identify hazardous sites, especially in countries where the Seveso 
Directive has not yet been adopted. 
1 The Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) is an 
internationally agreed-upon standard managed by the United Nations.  The EU CLP 
Regulation is an adaptation of the GHS to the EU classification system. 
2017 Chemical Accident Risks Seminar and Training Workshop  60 
 
7.1. Highlights from the session 
Many EU and EU-affiliated countries have invested considerable effort to find 
reasonable solutions to justify decisions regarding Seveso site status when the only 
basis is a substance with multiple options for classification within the EU CLP 
regulatory framework   This session aired experiences, both successes and 
challenges, confronted by Member States. Key messages drawn from this session are 
described below: 
The application of the CLP-Regulation to major accident hazards was one of 
the major changes in adopting the Seveso III Directive. A number of 
problematic areas have emerged in the practical application. Moreover, even in the 
new CLP-Regulation, classification according to dangerous properties remains an 
elusive goal for some substances that by nature are not easily classifiable in this 
sense. 
Some specific issues include: 
 Classification of substances for which there are no harmonized criteria, or for 
which the harmonized criteria do not cover all hazard categories 
 Managing the classification of mixtures, in particular where the component 
substances have different hazard classifications 
 Acceptability of the information given in Safety Data Sheets 
 Classification of wastes 
 Definition of “alternative fuels” 
 Managing substances which, in the form that they are available on-site, cannot 
lead to a major accident.  
7.1.1 Observations regarding the influence of CLP-Regulations and 
REACH on Seveso Directive implementation 
The REACH process intends for classification to be an open and dynamic 
process.  It is largely agreed among stakeholders that this approach has important 
benefits.  It provides transparency to users and it can foster dialogue among 
producers and stakeholders to achieve a balanced result.  It also allows new 
information to be considered as it becomes available.  Various speakers pointed out 
the advantages and disadvantages of the openness of the REACH process as it 
affected Seveso Directive implementation.   
The new regime brings significant opportunity for stakeholder engagement 
in the EU classification and labelling process. The speaker from the Chemicals 
Association noted that data transparency made it possible to exchange views on data 
interpretations so that in the end all parties could reach a scientific consensus.  This 
opportunity represented a significant improvement to allow scientific debate prior to  
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 Where the notification results in different classifications for the same 
substance,  notifiers and registrants shall make every effort to come to an 
agreed entry in the inventory 
 The CLP notification gives generic information on risk management measures 
for the safe use, storage and disposal of substances and mixtures, including 
control measures related to accidental exposure of humans or accidents at 
sites where such substances are used. 
 REACH could also establish more defined procedures for collecting and 
assessing information on the properties and hazards of substances that 
imposes a higher burden of proof on companies who notify substance  
classifications 
 REACH could require companies to identify and register their substances jointly 
with other manufactures such that they agree on a substance’s self-
classification. 
 REACH could require companies to make further efforts to identify and manage 
the risks linked to the substances they manufacture and market in the EU, 
with giving advice, training or demonstrations on how the substance can be 
safely handled to downstream users.  
7.1.2 Observations regarding Seveso Directive substance 
criteria 
Sweden described how the Seveso Directive criteria do not always render 
decisive and unambiguous results when applied to the classification of mixtures, 
particularly when the mixture involves more than one dangerous substance.  This 
type of situation can emerge in association with a number of different activities, but it 
should be emphasized that the classification of waste in particular is often dependent 
on this kind of interpretation. 
Countries are at liberty to impose stricter criteria than the Directive.  
Denmark presented new provisions in the Denmark transposition of Seveso covering 
intermediate storage sites and reductions in qualifying quantities for lower tier sites 
with ammonia or chlorine that are also > 200 m from populous areas.   
7.1.3  Difficulties with UN ADR classification:  Organic peroxide 
Israel described their struggles with classification of certain formulations of 
organic peroxides under the current UN classifications for dangerous goods 
transport, particular as they relate to storage.  Class 5.2 defines 5 categories of 
organic peroxides for storage, ranging from explosive or very fast burning to minor 
hazards. The classification takes into account the transportation class (7 categories 
for organic peroxide from A - G) and the burning rate, and assuming that the goods 
are stored in accordance with the maximum, size, type and material for packaging as 
required in transport.   
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Israel has noted that many organic peroxides in commercial use do not have sufficient 
data to allow decisive classification within the UN system.  In particular, without 
adequate data to confirm a definitive explosive or burning hazard, organic peroxides 
from some sources, on very little evidence, may be labelled and packaged as minor 
hazards.  In storage, these same substances, despite a lack of sufficient data, may 
then also be assigned minimum separation distances consistent with other minor 
hazards.  
As a consequence, Israel has taken the approach that: 
 Sub-classes A-D shall be treated as explosives  
 A TNT equivalent of 80% will be used when there is no other data in the 
literature 
Israel also invited further exploration of the topic with foreign experts. 
7.2. Identifying hazardous sites in pre-Seveso 
countries 
Identification of likely sites for Seveso coverage is often undertaken in pre-
Seveso countries, such as many Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries, in 
order to assess potential resource and competence issues that will arise once new 
comprehensive legislation is authorized.  In the absence of a notification requirement 
for all hazardous sites, countries will use alternative methodologies and information 
gathered from existing enforcement and monitoring activities associated with 
chemicals management, environment and civil protection and labour safety.     
Both Kosovo and Armenia described the process they have used to develop hazardous 
site inventories.  Kosovo used information available from operators, information 
already provided by operators, data collected through inspections, as well as an 
existing inventory of sites in the Department of Environmental Protection for this 
purpose.  In this way, Kosovo was able to identify many major hazard sites, targeting 
in particular, those using heavy oil, liquefied petroleum gas, diesel, gasoline, and 
chlorine. 
In close co-operation with the UN Development Programme, Armenia has established 
several priorities for disaster risk reduction, including specifically topics associated 
with chemical accident risks.  In line with this strategy, Armenia  is testing the UNEP-
OCHA 23  Flash Environmental Assessment Tool (FEAT) methodology to identify a 
number of hazardous facilities in Armenia.  The results of this exercise will then be 
used to compare  results with  existing normative guidance, such as how the findings 
match assumptions used in existing safety passports and response plans associated 
                                          
23  The Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit (JEU) is a partnership that pairs the 
environmental expertise of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
the humanitarian response network coordinated by the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
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with hazardous sites.  Further applications of the methodology could also have 
implications for consequence analysis, land-use planning and improvements to both 
local and national emergency response planning. 
7.3. Future implications and potential follow-up 
Pursuant to the meeting the CARS Steering Committee met to discuss what ideas 
could be taken forward from the presentations in this session.  The Committee made 
the following observations: 
Effective governance of chemical accident risks requires knowing the degree 
and type of hazard, and where the hazard is located.  Hence, implementation of 
every government programme starts with the establishment of a national inventory of 
major hazard sites.  Countries establishing new programmes have the challenge of 
getting adequate information to identify their hazardous sites as far in advance of 
implementation, so that it can be planned with adequate resources and interventions 
are targeted appropriately with realistic timelines.  Countries with mature 
programmes have the challenge of making sure their site inventory matches reality. 
Substance classification matters.  For good reason, authorities and operators are 
particularly sensitive to the costs, not just in Euros but in lives, of making wrong 
judgments about which sites are hazardous and why.  Keeping up with new 
substances and new information affecting classification of known substances is 
essential to maintaining an up-to-date risk management strategy that uses available 
resources in the best way possible. 
Classification of dangerous substances has always been problematic for 
some substances for a variety of reasons, e.g., insufficient data, conflicting data 
interpretations, influence of processing conditions, non-normative behavior, etc.  The 
EU CLP Regulation and the GHS are not immune but are relatively new, such that the 
processes for making improvements are still in development. 
The application of generic criteria, an approach taken by the UN GHS Classification 
System, EU CLP Directive and adapted further by the Seveso III Directive, is a 
standard and well-accepted approach to regulation of dangerous substances.  It is 
also true that these instruments, perhaps deliberately to an extent, do not fully 
address the challenge of making generic rules fit the infinite possibilities associated 
with certain categories of substances, notably mixtures (and particularly waste), and 
substances such as organic peroxides and ammonia nitrate, all of whose dangerous 
properties vary substantially with different formulations.  
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Identification of likely sites for Seveso coverage is often undertaken in pre-
Seveso countries, such as many Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries, in 
order to assess potential resource and competence issues that will arise once new 
comprehensive legislation is authorized.  In the absence of a notification requirement 
for all hazardous sites, countries will use alternative methodologies and information 
gathered from existing enforcement and monitoring activities associated with 
chemicals management, environment and civil protection and labour safety.     
 
7.4.  Additional sources of information 
European Chemicals Agency. CLP Inventory.  EU database maintained by the 
European Chemicals Agency containing classification and labelling information on 
notified and registered substances received from manufacturers and importers. 
https://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals/cl-inventory-database  
UN Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS). 
Home Page.  
https://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_welcome_e.html  
EU CLP Legislation. https://echa.europa.eu/regulations/clp/legislation  
European Chemicals Agency. 2017. Guidance on the Application of the CLP Criteria: 
Guidance to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging 
Conclusions:  The EU CLP Regulation has introduced some significant 
improvements, in particular, self-classification by manufacturers, that 
encourage transparency and are self-maintaining.  The new openness 
afforded by the EU CLP regulation may eventually reduce uncertainties associated 
with classification of certain substances, but at the moment, there are not enough 
mechanisms for dialogue that can make the system not only open but dynamic.  
There is room for initiative among industry and government stakeholders to help 
close this gap. 
For some types of substances, it is likely that ongoing dialogue is always 
necessary.  Finding the right classification for specific substances may to some 
degree always be an iterative process.  Some cases may also benefit from 
clarifications in future revisions to Seveso legislation, but this is likely to be far in 
the future.  
Countries working towards higher levels of governance of chemical 
accident risks, such as alignment with the Seveso Directive, correctly 
prioritize establishment of a national inventory of hazardous sites even prior 
to adopting the enabling legislation.  Capacity building should include fostering 
exchange and collaboration to support countries in developing strategies to identify 
and qualify hazardous sites. Standardized training tools on applying the Seveso 
substance criteria within the context of the EU CLP Regulation could also be useful. 
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(CLP) of substances and mixtures. Version 5.0. European Chemicals Agency.  
Helsinki, Finland. ECHA-17-G-21-EN  
https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/23036412/clp_en.pdf/58b5dc6d-ac2a-
4910-9702-e9e1f5051cc5  
Z. Gyenes. 2011. Application of GHS Substances Classification Criteria for the 
Identification of Seveso Establishments. Report on the Work of the Technical Working 
Group on Seveso and GHS. Joint Research Centre. European Commission. 
Luxembourg. EUR 24734 EN 
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/EN/content/minerva/765297fa-f3f6-4828-bfdb-
9dc619853bd6/srtseviighspdf  
Questions and Answers Seveso III Directive (Version March 2016).  This document  
contains advice on a number of issues associated with application of Seveso 
requirements, including application of Seveso substance criteria.  
https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/68779c2d-772b-43d6-a361-
b6c025df4096/Questions%20%26%20Answers%20Seveso-III-
Directive%20(version%20March%202016).pdf  
Seveso Expert Group website. This public Interest Group contains information on the 
Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) related information documents the work of the 
Seveso Expert Group (SEG) research related to major accidents reporting, workshops, 
conferences, seminars, etc.  
https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp  
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8. Summary of Observations and Conclusions 
The Chemical Accident Risks Seminar and Training Workshops was an event designed 
for competent authorities with Seveso-type responsibilities in EU and EU-affiliated 
countries.  It aimed to produce a highly inclusive and informative event for all 
countries. Among participants there was substantial diversity in particular in regard 
to: 
 Types of competent authorities participating, including mainly environmental 
protection, civil protection and labour safety, 
 Differences between countries in the types of substances and industries that 
each country faces, and the intensity of the industrial economy 
 A wide variation in regard to programme maturity, especially between EU/EEA 
countries vs. EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries.  
In addition, it was expected that the seminar discussions would result in ideas and 
topics that could be further explored to improve chemicals risk management in 
Europe and beyond. 
8.1.  Seminar achievements in the domain of 
networking and exchange 
The topics were selected on the basis that they were common areas of concern in 
most countries regardless of their differences.  It was also known that almost all 
country experts would find value in training on the ADAM and RAPID-N consequence 
and risk assessment tools. 
There is substantial evidence that the specific objectives of the workshop were met as 
indicated in Table 2 on page 67. 
In addition to evaluations, the atmosphere surrounding the event was dynamic, in 
particular, there was proactive participation of diverse participants in the discussions 
during the seminar sessions and trainings.  The person-to-person dialogue among 
participants and with JRC staff also appeared to confirm that many participants were 
enthusiastic and motivated by the event.  Specifically in regard to the ADAM and 
RAPID-N tools, many experts expressed genuine appreciation for the new possibilities 
that the tools offer competent authorities who typically have far fewer resources than 
industry dedicated to consequence and risk assessment.   
8.2.  What was learned and the work ahead 
As indicated in the session summaries, the seminar and training event stimulated 
considerable reflection, introduced some new findings, confirmed some 
preconceptions and clarified some misconceptions, and in particular offered numerous  
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Table 2 Evidence of Seminar Achievements by Objective 
Objective: To identify the need for further work by the Seveso community on new 
emerging risks/new developments in the area of industrial accident prevention 
The seminar addressed five different topics associated with chemical accident risks, based on 
input from competent authorities by email exchange and in the Steering Committee. 
A number of observations within each session led to conclusions about potential future areas of 
work as identified in the “Future implications and conclusions” sections of this document. 
Both training and further tools development for consequence and risk analysis of chemical and 
Natech accidents were identified as ongoing needs in competent authorities in EU and EU-
affiliated countries. 
Objective: To expand the existing EU/EEA exchange network to include all EU-
affiliated countries 
Seventy (70) experts from 30 different EU and EU-affiliated countries, participated. 
7/10 EU-affiliated countries and 16/20 EU/EEA countries made presentations. 
Participant evaluations indicated that there were benefits for both Seveso and pre-Seveso 
countries.  
Network and exchange was rated as a valuable outcome in 18 out of 25 (72%) of participant 
evaluations. 
Some initiatives for bilateral support  between Seveso and Enlargement/Neighbourhood 
Countries are currently underway (Romania-Moldova, Norway-Israel) 
Objective: To rejuvenate exchange between EU/EEA countries that had diminished in 
recent years  
2/3 of Seveso countries participated in the event.   
Member States priorities were well-represented in the agenda that covered cross-cutting issues 
for Seveso implementation and risk management in general. 
Conclusions in this report are intended to support future collaboration and exchange on key 
issues for managing chemical accident risks in future. 
Objective: To provide an opportunity for training on the JRC’s flagship risk analysis 
products for Seveso competent authorities, the ADAM (chemical accidents) and 
RAPID-N (Natech accidents) consequence and risk assessment tools. 
Fifty-two (52) participants (73%) requested and received training on the ADAM (chemical 
accident) and RAPID-N (Natech) consequence and risk assessment tools during the event.   
Participation was relatively evenly distributed between Seveso and pre-Seveso countries.   
The JRC is following up on bilateral training requests emerging from the workshops (e.g., 
Bulgaria, Ukraine). 
Based on the feedback, more multilateral and bilateral workshops will be planned in 2018 and 
beyond.   
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ideas for future collaboration and exchange.  Some central themes are highlighted in 
relation to each topic in the paragraphs that follow.   
Competent authorities need comprehensive consequence analysis tools that 
are cheaper, easier-to use, more versatile and transparent than what is 
available currently in the marketplace.  Competent authorities can face a vast range 
of situations from site to site, with variation in type substance, size of site, level of 
competency, risk assessment methods used, and geographic location. There are no 
comparable applications in the marketplace for Natech accident risk analysis nor that 
allow the wide range of flexibility and customization of analysis design as ADAM. 
These applications are tailor-made for authorities but are also used by industry and 
practitioners. 
There is overwhelming evidence from competent authorities that the ADAM and 
RAPID-N applications fill an enormous gap in the arsenal of tools available for 
countries to help protect citizens from negative aspects of industrial development.  
The eagerness with which competent authorities embrace these tools was not only 
confirmed by this training event but also past training events, as well as by feedback 
from stakeholder tests during development, and by actual users. RAPID-N has already 
been applied to earthquake-triggered Natech risk assessment since some years.  
Indeed, the JRC has provided technical support to Member States in chemical accident 
risk assessment for more than 25 years.  The advances in IT technology now make it 
possible for the JRC to deliver more targeted and wide-ranging support through user-
friendly and sophisticated applications. It is expected that these tools may become 
embedded into core functions of many competent authorities – in environmental 
protection, civil protection and labour safety, in particular - in the EU and EU-affiliated 
countries in coming years. 
While safety performance indicators (SPIs) have been in use in many 
companies (mostly large multinationals) for more than two decades, 
industry is only now developing a common understanding on their design 
and functionality. Nonetheless, confusion and skepticism surrounding their use have 
not entirely disappeared.  Skepticism often is generated in large part from the 
confusion.  While no one disputes the concept of SPIs as an ideal, interpretation of 
what they actually should be and how they should be applied appears to vary widely.   
Guidance is emerging in industry and more consensus and models of good practice 
are likely to evolve from these efforts.  The major industry associations are making 
reporting certain measures a condition of membership.  (Although these reportable 
indicators represent a narrow range of measures, they serve a slightly different 
purpose than site-specific measures since the public is the targeted audience rather 
than any specific site.)  While much more development needs to take place, these 
outcomes represent significant progress, requiring many years of dedicated effort to 
achieve. 
Government authorities in many cases either ignore safety performance indicators or 
struggle with how to use in a compliance context, although a few countries have 
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embraced them. Even when both sides are enthusiastic about the concept, there may 
still be disagreement on what should be measured and interpretation of results. The 
discussions at the seminar indicated that in both industry and government, there is a 
lot of work to do to understand whether and how safety performance indicators can 
be a relevant and even vital component of chemical accident risk management. 
Context is important. In some companies, SPIs provided considerable value as a 
communication tool within the organization and the metrics selected have no 
operational value except to communicate.  However, if they are intended to be an 
integral part of site safety performance monitoring, they must give meaningful and 
timely feedback on safety performance. In the latter role, the SPI must be designed 
to give feedback on aspects of operations that affect safety. 
The issue of maintaining site and process infrastructure and equipment may 
be an old issue, but it remains possibly the most fundamental principle of 
chemical process risk management. It is never more relevant than today, even 
considering that the industrial age is now arguably two centuries old.  At this stage, 
every country in the world is exposed to industrial risk from its operations to some 
extent and some to a very large extent.   
Considerable industrial expansion took place throughout the world in the latter half of 
the 20th century.  There are a lot of sites more than 20 and even 40 years old that are 
still operating.  Mechanical integrity requires unyielding attention on older sites.   
Notably, many of these sites are oil and gas operations, such as refineries, where a 
high volume of dangerous substances is common and the infrastructure is vast. 
New technologies need to take lessons from the old ones, even virtual technologies.  
Right now they seem unbreakable, but in 20 years they will suffer from degradation 
and obsolescence, just like the older industries.  It remains important for industry and 
government to use all means available, data collection, risk-based approaches, 
development new tools, etc. in order to reduce risks from infrastructure and 
equipment failures.  
If mechanical integrity is the old-timer in this group, cyber safety and 
security is the newcomer.  The seminar featured an interesting mix of 
presentations from industry, researchers, and government authorities. Awareness of 
potential impacts of automation and network-linked functions has been growing and 
some organizations have already been working to understand the main issues and 
define new standards to address them. 
From the work underway, it appears that significant improvements to assure 
reliability and integrity of equipment and infrastructure are already implemented or 
well progressed.  Moreover, there is a question as to whether cyber security threats in 
any way are nearly as high a concern as threats to plant physical integrity.  On the 
other hand, while increased connectivity and automation can greatly reduce some 
process risks, they also can sometimes create raise new questions for process risk 
management and regulatory enforcement.  Incidents have already arisen with 
connectivity as a common cause and continuously unmanned sites operated from long 
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distances, even other countries, represent a new permutation of an old model (the 
unmanned site) that has never made regulators very comfortable. 
Moreover, the vast majority of regulators, and possibly many operators, are just at 
the beginning of the information gathering stage on how IT technology can change a 
process risk profile, what standards are in place to assist risk management, and 
where the gaps in understanding and guidance remain.  This topic is likely to become 
a mainstream part of process safety exchanges for the long term future. 
The field of process safety has long recognized the importance of safety 
management systems to address the management rather than the technical 
factors affecting chemical accident risk.  In the past decade or so, there has 
been widespread  emphasis on the role of organizational factors on the functionality 
of the safety management system.  That is, the structures and processes within an 
organization are now considered have a tremendous influence in the effectiveness of 
safety management on major hazard sites.   
It has taken an accumulation of serious accidents and disasters to focus attention in 
this direction.  It also seems that as awareness about organizational factors has 
grown, causal evidence can be found everywhere, even in analysis of accidents 
occurring decades before.  The proliferation of multinational companies across the 
globe, the industrialization of countries in all parts of the world, the transformative 
role of automation in industrial processes, and many other developments have the 
potential to have both positive and negative impacts on how organizations see their 
risks.  Moreover, technology will continue to revolutionize the workplace and the ups 
and downs of the economy will continue to produce dramatic shifts of ownership and 
employment as well as new management strategies in hazardous industries. 
Both government and industry have endorsed the notion that management of 
organizational change is part of chemical accident risk management.  Some steps 
forward such as the OECD guidance on corporate leadership and on ownership change 
have already been taken.  There is a lot more work to do. 
Proper identification of dangerous substances on site is vitally important to 
making the right decision about prioritizing and managing chemical accident 
hazards.  Among all the information needed to make good risk management 
decisions, every risk assessment starts with hazard identification.  Every hazard 
identification starts with the identification of dangerous substances on site.  To 
manage risks effectively, sites have to know each dangerous substances on site, how 
dangerous it is, how much there is of it, and what it can do if planned controls of the 
danger fail.   
Nonetheless, obtaining clear and definitive data to classify every substance and 
mixture of substances with certainty is a never-ending process.  The rules developed 
over time and enshrined in such instruments as the UN GHS, the EU CLP Regulation 
and the Seveso Directive, provide more clarity than ever before. In particular, they 
allow more debate and transparency over how classification decisions are reached.  
But these instruments are never as clever as nature, so the way forward is to 
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continue to work together to fill the gaps through creating and using mechanisms to 
promote dialogue and consensus.  The instruments themselves may also in time be 
improved as experience brings more understanding.   
Considerable work in future lies ahead in finding ways to share and make decisions 
together on the basis of new information and in adapting the instruments to 
incorporate new knowledge that can be generically applied to a set of problems that 
affects many substances.  
8.3.  Final observations 
Just like the technologies that produce them, chemical accident risks are complex, 
making heavy demands on engineering, natural sciences, the psychological fields of 
human and organizational behavior, and the science of business management, to 
name a few of the disciplines that need to be regularly consulted.  With so many 
factors, and so many analytical specialties needed to understand them, managing and 
overseeing chemical accident risks cannot be successful in isolation.  Operators and 
authorities have an awesome responsibility shared by counterparts around the world, 
and they need to be able to get help from each other.  Hopefully, in various ways, 
these types of events can continue to be held as long as our social well-being and 
economic survival depend on goods generated through industrial production and 
technologies.  
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